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Robert C. Berring has called West Publishing Company’s American Digest System 
“the key aspect of the new form of legal literature” that West and other publishers 
developed in the last quarter of the nineteenth century.  Berring argued that West’s 
digests provided practicing lawyers not only the means for locating precedential 
cases, but a “paradigm for thinking about the law itself” that influenced American 
lawyers until the development of online legal research systems in the 1970s. This 
article discusses questions raised by Berring’s scholarship, and examines the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth century legal environment in which the West digests 
were created and became essential research tools for American lawyers. 
 
I. Introduction 
[W]hile a digest is a device of somewhat higher order than an index, it is after all only a labor-
saving device. It is a mere tool for digging the precious metals from the mines of judicial 
reports, and is in no sense a medium for the inculcation of legal principles, and logical 
methods in the application thereof. 
Benjamin Tradwell, Suggestions for a Practical Digest, 3 Am. Law. 337, 337 (1895). 
Sometimes we are least aware of that which most affects us. So it seems with respect to legal 
categories. …They inhibit our imagination of what is acceptable, indeed, of what is possible. 
They take on a quality of givenness and thereby disempower us. 
Gregory S. Alexander, The Transformation of Trusts as a Legal Category, 1800–1914, 5 Law & Hist. 
Rev. 303, 303 (1987). 
Steven Lastres’s 2013 paper, “Rebooting Legal Research in a Digital Age”1 could be a wake-
up call for academic law librarians involved in legal research instruction.  Reporting the results of 
a LexisNexis-funded survey, the paper covers the amount of research newer associates in large 
and small law firms are required to perform, the extent to which they rely on electronic sources, 
and how little training they receive from their employers. At a time when law schools are placing 
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renewed emphasis on graduating students with practice-ready skills, the paper provides arguments 
for including legal research training in those efforts, and is worth distributing to law students 
skeptical of the value of legal research courses. 
Lastres reports briefly on the research processes of the newer associates.2  The survey results 
show heavy reliance on online research sources, which aligns with the data reported annually in 
the American Bar Association Legal Technology Resource Center’s survey of legal research 
practices.3   The paper includes a section under the heading: “A legal classification is rarely 
followed,” discussing how infrequently newer lawyers use classification systems.  A short 
discussion suggests both that very few begin case law research by consulting a legal classification 
system and that “a third of respondents admit typically not accessing a legal classification system 
at all when conducting case law research.”4  
This result seems neither very surprising nor perhaps worthy of the space it occupies in a short 
paper.5 Its prominence may be understandable, however, in light of the continuing impact of the 
scholarship of Bob Berring and others regarding the influences of West Publishing Company’s 
digest system on legal research and American law itself. 6   
In the first of a series of articles published mostly between 1986 and 2000, Berring called the 
digests “the key aspect of the new form of legal literature” that West developed in the last quarter 
of the nineteenth century.7 Not only did the West digests provide the means for locating 
precedential cases, a practicing lawyer’s primary concern, but they also created “a paradigm for 
thinking about the law itself.”8 Once exposed to West’s Key Number System, “[l]awyers began to 
think according to the West categories.”9 For Berring, by creating a classification system with a 
location “for every possible legal issue . . . [West’s] subject arrangement lent its structure to 
American law.”10   
Berring was not the first to consider the possible influences of the digest and other forms of 
legal publication on lawyers’ thinking.  In the 1923 first edition of his classic textbook on legal 
research, Frederick C. Hicks anticipated Berring in the statement that: “With the multiplicity of 
                                                 
2 Id. at 5. 
3 The 2013 data show, for example, that only 10.7 percent of surveyed lawyers begin their research with print 
materials. 5 American Bar Association Legal Technology Resource Center Survey Report: Online Research V-
22 (2013).   
4 Lastres, supra note 1 at 5. 
5 In correspondence with the author, Lastres suggests that one of the objectives of the study “was to uncover how 
newer attorneys (digital natives) conduct case law and statutory legal research….  [R]egarding legal classification 
systems, the thought was that the question might prove insightful for those schools that continue teach a more 
traditional research curriculum where classification systems are strongly emphasized.” Email from Steven A. 
Lastres to Richard Danner (Aug. 28, 2013, 15:50 EDT). 
6 For a review of Berring’s writings and those of his contemporaries, see Richard A. Danner, Legal Information 
and the Development of American Law: Writings on the Form and Structure of the Published Law, 99 Law Libr. 
J. 193 (2007) [hereinafter, Danner, Development of American Law], reprinted in Richard A. Danner & Frank G. 
Houdek, eds., Legal Information and the Development of American Law 6 (2008) (with bibliography).  
7 Berring, Robert C., Full-Text Databases and Legal Research: Backing into the Future, 1 High Tech. L. J. 27, 
31 (1986). [hereinafter, Berring, Full-Text Databases]. 
8 Id. at 32–33.  
9 Id. at 33. 
10 Robert C. Berring, Legal Research and Legal Concepts: Where Form Molds Substance, 75 Cal. L. Rev. 15, 25 
(1987) [hereinafter, Berring, Form Molds Substance]. 
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decided cases the whole fabric of the common law would long ago have broken down were it not 
for the digest.”11  Hicks acknowledged the troubling pace at which the amount of published law 
was growing, yet he wrote during a period of relative stability in the forms and formats of published 
legal information. The material was still all in one format—print—and accessible in law libraries 
through the digests, bulky and cumbersome as they might be.  
Berring, on the other hand, wrote at a time of great ferment and change in the ways that legal 
information was published, accessed, and used.  Since the mid-1970s, Lexis and Westlaw, the two 
primary American legal databases, had vastly expanded their offerings of both legal and non-legal 
sources.  Each service also offered search capabilities that allowed and encouraged lawyers to 
construct searches outside the structures of pre-coordinated indexes and digest topics.12 By the 
turn of the century, the Internet would emerge as an important alternative for research in law.  
Berring wondered what impacts comprehensive full-text electronic research systems providing 
both the texts of the law and new means to find them would have on lawyers accustomed to relying 
on legal materials in print and print tools like digests?  What might be lost as free-text electronic 
tools replaced indexed tools in print formats? 
This article begins in Section II with a history of the early development of the West digests, 
followed by in section III by a review of Berring’s ideas about the influences of the West digests 
on how American lawyers think about the law.  Section IV discusses the questions raised by 
Berring’s scholarship, and how his work challenges later writers to consider more precisely how 
the forms of legal information might influence lawyers’ thinking.  Section V then examines  the 
historical context in which the West digests were created and first became essential research tools 
for American lawyers. This section looks at three aspects of the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
century legal environment to see how lawyers of that period might have used digests and 
classification systems in that period in ways that that influenced their thinking about the law: (1) 
concerns within the legal profession about increasing numbers of so-called “case lawyers;” (2) the 
profession’s general interests in the benefits of projects to classify the law; and (3) how West’s 
own publications presented and characterized the digests during the latter part of the period. 
Section VI offers final thoughts on the possible influences of the West digest. 
  
                                                 
11 Frederick C. Hicks, Materials and Methods of Legal Research with Bibliographical Manual 251 (1923) 
[hereinafter Hicks, Materials and Methods].  Later, in his Concise History of the Common Law, T.F.T. Plucknett 
wrote:  
When faced with a difficult case, the advocates and the judges have to undertake research in order to find 
what law will govern it. The method which they pursue, the character of the books and sources which they 
use, and the attitude of mind with which they approach them, all have their influence upon the shaping of 
the law, and upon their conception of law itself. 
Theodore F.T. Plucknett, A Concise History of the Common Law 253 (5th ed. 1956).  
For another perspective, see Morris L. Cohen, Research Habits of Lawyers, 9 Jurimetrics J. 183, 188 (1969) 
[hereinafter Cohen, Research Habits] (“[T]he nature of legal bibliography is determined in many ways by the 
nature of the law itself, and, in turn, the nature of legal research is determined, in part at least, by the bibliography 
on which it works”). 
12 By 2002, Berring would tell new law students: “The odds of your actually using a paper digest anywhere in the 
real world are increasingly slim.”  Robert C. Berring & Elizabeth A. Edinger, Legal Research Survival Manual 
57 (2002). 
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II. A Brief History of the West Reporter System and Digests 
 
A. Rapidly Expanding Case Law and the West Reporters 
Common law lawyers have complained about the burdens of having to search through too 
many court decisions to locate precedential cases and worried over the impacts of the masses of 
cases on the common law system since long before the West digests appeared in the last quarter 
of the nineteenth century.  As Allan Hanson put it, “The threat [of cases overwhelming the system] 
has recurred with almost monotonous regularity throughout the history of the common law.” 13 
Until the mid-nineteenth century, however, the volume of American reports remained small 
enough that many practitioners could still read and retain what was necessary for them to practice, 
14 while continuing to complain about the growing numbers of law books. During the period of 
post-Civil War industrialization and geographic expansion, the number of decided cases in state 
and federal courts increased dramatically. Soon, the established systems for publishing decisions, 
based largely on official reporters appointed in each state, were no longer adequate for individual 
jurisdictions or on a national basis. Along with other entrepreneurial publishers, the West 
Publishing Company entered the growing market for published reports and succeeded in meeting 
lawyers’ demands for better reporting and access by developing standardized products notable for 
their accuracy, comprehensiveness, and timeliness.15  
Morris Cohen viewed West’s publications as part of “a series of bibliographic innovations 
which were to shape legal research for at least the next hundred years [and] enabled the bench and 
bar to retain orderly access to a legal literature which was growing so fast as to render research 
difficult and time-consuming.” 16 From modest beginnings in 1876 as a publisher of excerpted 
Minnesota court decisions in newspaper format,17 West soon became the major contributor to the 
                                                 
13 F. Allan Hanson, From Key Numbers to Keywords: How Automation Has Transformed the Law, 94 Law Libr. 
J. 563, 565 (2002).  Hanson also noted that lawyers are unusual among the disciplines in complaining about too 
much literature.  Other fields tend to view a growing body of literature as a sign of progress and developing 
knowledge.  He suggests that part of the explanation for this difference “may be that the past is easier to set aside 
in certain other disciplines…. [L]awyers’ objectives differ from those of other professionals in ways that 
emphasize the past.” Id. 
14 Berring, Form Molds Substance , supra note 10 at 19. In 1836, David Hoffman complained that “[t]he increase 
in this portion of our literature within the last thirty years, has no parallel in the judicial history of any other 
country.  More than four hundred and fifty volumes of American law reports now load our shelves!” David 
Hoffman, 2 A Course of Legal Study Addressed to Students and the Profession Generally 83 (2d ed. 1836).  
Charles Warren estimated that there were 800 volumes of American law reports in 1848. Charles Warren, A 
History of the American Bar 557 (1911). 
15 Berring, Form Molds Substance, supra note 10 at 21.  George Grossman suggests that a factor in West’s success 
was eliminating arguments of counsel from its reports.  George S. Grossman, Legal Research: Historical 
Foundations of the Electronic Age 77 (1994). 
16 Morris L Cohen, An Historical Overview of American Law Publishing, 31 Int'l J. Legal Info. 168, 175 (2003). 
Cohen found it “noteworthy that such research aids came largely from the imagination and commercial enterprise 
of individuals like John West and Frank Shepard, and not from scholars, academic organizations, or government 
agencies.”  Id. at 175. 
17 William W. Marvin, West Publishing Co.: Origin, Growth, Leadership 35 (1969). In addition to Marvin’s 
company history, sources for the history of West include: Ross E. Davies, How West Law Was Made: the 
Company, its Products, and its Promotions, 6 Charleston L. Rev. 231 (2012); W.E. Butler, John Briggs West and 
the Transformation of American Law Reports, in The Syllabi: Genesis of the National Reporter System iii (2011); 
Robert M. Jarvis, John B. West: Founder of the West Publishing Company, 50 Am. J. Legal Hist. 1 (2008–2010); 
Joe Morehead, All Cases Great and Small: the West Publishing Company Saga, Serials Lib’n., (1/2) 1988 at 3; 
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increased volume of published American case law through its series of unofficial reporters of court 
decisions, the National Reporter System.  Some of West’s competitors attempted to follow the 
English practice of selective publication of court opinions, but West’s comprehensive case 
reporting system prevailed in the marketplace and contributed to a “gigantic growth in published 
cases” during the last quarter of the nineteenth century.18  Grant Gilmore wrote in The Ages of 
American Law: 
After ten or fifteen years of life with the National Reporter System, the American legal 
profession found itself in a situation of unprecedented difficulty.  There were simply too 
many cases, and each year added its frightening harvest to the appalling glut.  A precedent-
based, largely non-statutory system could not long continue to operate under such 
pressures.19 
B. The Development of the West Digest 
In 1887, West began annual publication of the American Digest, a comprehensive national 
scheme designed to facilitate access to the rapidly growing body of reports.  If West’s system for 
reporting opinions had exacerbated the problem of too many cases, the company’s digests were 
intended to provide a solution for lawyers struggling to locate precedents. The American Digest 
was not the first comprehensive digest of American court opinions;20 but was established as a 
continuation to the U.S. Digest, which included both retrospective coverage of cases “from earliest 
days to 1870” and annual volumes for cases decided after 1871.21  After purchasing the U.S. Digest 
                                                 
Thomas A. Woxland, “Forever Associated with the Practice of Law”: The Early Years of West Publishing 
Company, Legal Reference Services Q., Spring 1985 at 115. 
18 Berring, Form Molds Substance, supra note 10 at 22. According to Warren, the number of volumes of published 
reports had grown to nearly 3,800 by 1885. Warren, supra note 14 at 557. 
19 Grant Gilmore, The Ages of American Law 59 (1977).  Noting that “[a]fter the ‘70s the printed sources of law 
became a flood,” Willard Hurst concluded that a common law legal system based on precedent, with numerous 
separate jurisdictions “was inherently costly to work with.  It required time-taking search for authorities.  It called 
for expensive law libraries.” James Willard Hurst, The Growth of American Law: The Law Makers 308 (1950). 
Hanson wrote that “The phenomenal volume of American reports was due less to a principled intention to arm 
lawyers with a rich field to mine for potential precedent than to the ambition to make some money.”  Hanson, 
supra note 13 at 566. 
20 In 1882, J.L. High noted “the large and rapidly increasing number of digests, indispensable in the use of this 
otherwise chaotic mass of reports,… forming a large and imposing library in themselves.” J. L. High, What Shall 
be Done with the Reports, 16 Am. L. Rev. 429, 434 (1882).  For a brief early history of the West digests (from a 
company perspective), see Frederick G. Stutz, Marking an Epoch, 2 Am. L. School Rev. 171 (1908). 
21 Marvin, supra note 17 at 68. In 1889, West purchased the rights to the U.S. Digest from its publisher and 
compiler and developed the U.S. Digest classification system into its own. Hicks, Materials and Methods, supra 
note 11 at 203. The principles of the U.S. Digest system were described by its creator in 1880.  Uniform Indexes, 
22 Alb. L.J. 179 (1880) (Letter to the Editor from Benjamin Vaughn Abbott, Aug. 18, 1880). West always 
acknowledged the role of Abbott’s system as the forerunner to its own.  See, e.g., Preface, 1 Century Edition of 
the American Digest iv (1897) [hereinafter, Century Edition] (noting the roots of the Century Edition 
classification system in the U.S. Digest); Marvin, supra note 17 at 68 (noting that the American Digest was 
“planned as a direct continuation of the U.S. Digest.”). 
Hicks notes that the American Digest was also known initially as the third series of the U.S. Digest.  Hicks,  
Materials and Methods, supra note 11 at 271.  The Complete Digest (1887–1889) combined with the American 
Digest in 1890.  Lawyer’s Co-op’s General Digest (1890–1907) was published after 1899 “in conjunction” with 
the American Digest.  Note, Consolidation of the American Digest and the General Digest, 34 Am. L. Rev. 243, 
243 (1900).  See also John Doyle, WESTLAW and the American Digest Classification Scheme, 84 Law. Libr. J. 
229, 231–32 (1992).  
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and another competing publication, the Complete Digest, 22 in 1897 West began publishing the 
Century Edition of the American Digest, billed in its subtitle as “A Complete Digest of all Reported 
American Cases from the Earliest Times to 1896.”23  The 50 volume set was completed in 1904, 
after which West continued to issue annual volumes of the American Digest, then decennial 
cumulations.  The First Decennial Digest, covering cases from 1897–1906, incorporated the West 
key number classification system,24 which provided the framework for organizing and finding the 
cases indexed in the company’s later digests. Eventually West published digests corresponding to 
its regional reporters of state decisions, as well as digests for individual states, the federal courts, 
and the U.S. Supreme Court.   
West’s first annual American Digest volumes did not include indexes to either the classification 
system or the cases it digested.  Starting in 1887, the annual cumulations were organized 
alphabetically by topic with an alphabetical table of contents indicating the numbers of digest 
paragraphs listed under each main head. Starting in 1890, the tables of contents included a note 
pointing out that, in addition the main heads, the Digest included “thousands of SPECIFIC cross-
references, carrying the researcher DIRECTLY TO THE PARAGRAPHS for which he is 
seeking.”25  
In 1897, West issued the first of the 50 volumes that would make up the Century Edition of the 
American Digest, completing the set in 1904.26    The spine of each volume of the Century Edition 
notes the range of topics or titles included in that volume: the spine of volume 26, for example, 
indicates that it includes titles from Homicide through Imprisonment.  The volume also includes 
an alphabetical list of the titles it includes.27  Two of those titles: Homicide, and Husband and Wife 
are main heads; the others are cross-reference heads which refer the researcher to main heads 
throughout the set.  The main heads have scope notes and are analyzed with detailed outlines 
leading to section numbers with references to cases and summaries. The scope note for Homicide 
defines what is covered and provides the titles of main heads for related topics that it doesn’t cover: 
Suicide, Conspiracy, Bail, and Death.28  There is also a list of cross-references to other topics.  The 
individual volumes of the Century Edition do not include an outline of the full classification system 
or an alphabetical list of all main heads.29  Volume 50 includes a comprehensive index of the main 
heads and cross-reference heads for the entire set with references to specific sections of main 
heads.30 
                                                 
22 In addition to purchasing the Complete Digest, West also hired its editor, John A. Mallory, who is credited as 
the creator of the classification system used in the Century Edition and the key number system introduced in the 
First Decennial Digest. Marvin supra note 17 at 70. 
23 1 Century Edition, supra note 21 at [i] (1897). 
24 Marvin, supra note 17 at 79. 
25 See, e.g., 1 Am. Digest vii (1890). 
26 The set in the Goodson Law Library at Duke appears to be an original edition.   
27 26 Century Edition, supra note 21 at  iii (1904). 
28 Id. at 1–2. 
29 Beginning in 1897, West did publish several editions of a guide to the classification system for indexers.  See, 
e.g., American Digest Classification Scheme: A Logical Analysis of the Law for the Use of Indexers and Digest 
Makers (1897).  The guides included an explanation of the classification scheme, the digest headings, and scope-
notes.  A similar guide was published in the first edition of Brief Making and the Use of Law Books.  See Nathan 
Abbott, ed., Brief Making and the Use of Law Books 189 (1906)[hereinafter Brief Making (1906)]. 
30 50 Century Edition, supra note 21 at 1865–66. 
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The researcher could therefore enter the Century Edition by choosing a volume likely to 
include main heads or cross-reference heads for the topic being researched, or (after it was 
published in 1904) by consulting the comprehensive index.  Either approach would lead to cases 
relevant to the research topic, but neither provided much context for what was found.  Placed 
alphabetically with the other main heads, Homicide reveals little about its relationship to the other 
heads classified under the broader topic: Crime.  If the researcher were interested in something as 
specific as claims of self-defense, the comprehensive index refers directly to sections 138–176 
under Homicide, each of which covers a specific aspect of self-defense, such as section 170 (“Duty 
to retreat when attack is on one’s own premises”), but it bypasses the scope note and analysis for 
Homicide.   
In either situation, the researcher could broaden the inquiry and learn more about the law of 
homicide or, with a bit more effort, learn how the topic Homicide fit into the overall classification 
scheme, but there is no way we can know whether or how often this happened.  Would the lawyers 
of the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century have seen much value in such exercises 
after the digest had already taken them directly to cases on point for their research? 
In 1904, West included a 450 page index to all fifty volumes in the final volume of the Century 
Edition of the American Digest.  The index entries were made up of the Century Edition’s “Main 
Heads, and Cross-Reference Heads with the references thereunder.”31 In contrast, upon completion 
of the first Decennial Digest in 1912, the company published a 2,000 page Descriptive Word Index 
to the Decennial.  An early advertisement for the new index noted that it included “words and 
terms descriptive of the persons, places and things, as well as of the crimes, torts, contracts and 
remedies which have been the subject of litigation.”32 The descriptive word indexes thereby 
allowed lawyers to search for cases using factual terms and others beyond those that were elements 
of the digest classification, and to go directly to specific key numbers listing cases useful to their 
research.  Although the advertisement described the classification system as “simplicity itself,” it 
pointed out that the Descriptive Word Index would aid searchers who asked “[h]ow do I find the 
Key-Number for the proposition which I am investigating?” but were “not familiar with [the 
system’s] logical and scientific arrangement.”33 How would these lawyers be influenced by the 
classification system if they followed an approach that allowed or perhaps encouraged them to 
avoid using it to locate cases?  
C. Distinguishing Classification Systems and Indexes 
In thinking about the possible influences of the West digests on the thinking of individual 
lawyers, it is helpful to consider the distinctions between classification systems and indexes.  As 
explained by Allan Hanson, a classification system “reflects ideas about meaningful relationships 
among the parts in the body of information being classified”; an index, on the other hand, is a 
finding device and “conveys nothing about relationships that may exist among different topics.”34  
Hanson saw West’s system as a “classified index,” which served both the classification and 
indexing functions.  As a result, “the taxonomic classifications built into print research tools 
                                                 
31 50 Century Edition, supra note 21 at 1866–67. 
32 Advertisement: Editorial by the Advertising Manager, 1 Docket (West) [n.p.] (Sept. 1912).  The title page of 
the Index itself described it as “A means of finding the authorities in point through the words descriptive of the 
legal principles or of the facts in the case.” 
33 Id.  
34 Hanson, supra note 13 at 574. 
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promote a view of the law as a hierarchically organized system based on general principles.”35  
This view applies generally accepted ideas about the influences of categories and classifications 
to the digests.   It also supports Berring’s arguments regarding the digest’s influences.36 
In the nineteenth century, American lawyers had to rely on the “classified indexes” of digest 
classification systems to locate cases relevant to the problems they were researching.  Although 
some pre-West digests included separate alphabetical lists of headings that could take the 
researcher directly to a useful topic in the classification system, they were not considered primary 
means of entrance into the system. The Abbott brothers’ 1877 digest of New York state cases, for 
example, included a comprehensive index to the entire five volume set, but the compilers advised 
its users that “[f]or the most part, the book is its own Index. For a clue to the place where any topic 
is treated at length, the reader must resort, in the first instance, to the body of the work [and] its 
alphabetical arrangement….”  The index was to be used for the limited purposes of locating 
“kindred points” or “matters that belong to no one title of the law.”37   
Until other publishers started to adopt West’s classification system in the late nineteenth 
century,38 digests were arranged according to the individual and perhaps idiosyncratic systems of 
each editor, creating problems of inconsistency that became more apparent as the amount of case 
law continued to grow.  In 1896, the ABA Committee on Law Reporting and Digesting, which 
was generally favorable to the efforts of commercial law book publishers, criticized the available 
digests and indexes for problems of inconsistency and poor arrangement:   
Each digester and every reporter seems to have adopted a plan which seemed best and 
most convenient to him, without much regard to the views of others engaged in the same 
work, and in many cases with but little attention to the convenience of those for whose use 
the work is intended.39  
In 1898 the ABA Committee’s report again emphasized the importance of consistency and noted 
that “[i]t does not matter so much what plan of classification is adopted as that we shall know 
clearly what the plan is, and that the same plan is always followed.”  The report then pointed out 
that the digest’s purpose “is to enable any lawyer to find any point in any decision, and the most 
essential feature of all is a full index in addition to this alphabetical order of topics.”40 
                                                 
35 Id.   
36 See, e.g., Gregory S. Alexander, The Transformation of Trusts as a Legal Category, 1800–1914, 5 Law & Hist. 
Rev. 303 (1987); Geoffrey C. Bowker & Susan Leigh Star, Sorting Things Out: Classification and its 
Consequences (1999).  Berring relied on Bowker and Star in arguing that, as a classification system matures, 
initial decisions made regarding its construction tend to be forgotten, and the system is seen as authoritative and 
“simply describ[ing] the universe.” Robert C. Berring, Legal Research and the World of Thinkable Thoughts, 2 
J. App. Prac. & Process 305, 310 (2000) [hereinafter, Berring, Thinkable Thoughts], citing Bowker & Star, supra 
at 33. 
37 6 Benjamin Vaughan Abbott & Austin Abbott, A Digest of New York Statutes and Reports, from the Earliest 
Period 669 (new ed. 1877). 
38 See Report of the Committee on Law Reporting and Digesting, 23 Ann. Rep. A.B.A. 376, 376–77 (1900) 
(describing increasing use of West’s classification system by other publishers). 
39 Report of Committee on Law Reporting and Digesting, 19 Ann. Rep. A.B.A. 398, 401(1896).  The Committee 
found only one attempt to create a system that could be used as the basis for a common system: a “Table of 
Subjects and Cross References for Legal Indexes” prepared by the reporter of the New York Supreme Court, 
Marcus Hun. Id. at 401. 
40 Report of the Committee on Law Reporting and Digesting, 21 Ann. Rep. A.B.A. 437, 449 (1898).  
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III. Berring’s Ideas on the Influence of the West Digest 
Berring argued that, because American lawyers relied on West’s digests to locate the 
information they needed for their daily work, they came to think about the law through the concepts 
embodied in the digest classification system.  In 1986, he pointed out that the system “not only 
enabled lawyers to research cases by subject, it also allowed and encouraged lawyers to fit every 
legal issue into a certain conceptual framework.” 41  “The location of issues and cases in the digests 
provided “a substantive context, a setting that told the searcher the meaning of the case as much 
as did the opinion itself.”42 In terms of the system’s long-term impacts on American law:  
Over the 110 years of the West era, the West System became so embedded in legal thought 
that it became invisible. We thought in West terms, we discussed law in West categories. 
. . . Without realizing it, we all depended on West for giving us ways to think coherently 
about the hundreds of thousands of cases that were stuffed into the reporters.43 
Over time, the system “became staggeringly complex and soon was understandable only to its 
makers,”44 but “[t]he beautiful part was that they did not have to fully understand how it worked . 
. . . The categories established by the Digest system were deeply ingrained.”45 As a result, 
“Generations of lawyers learned to conceptualize legal problems using the categories of the Topics 
and Key Numbers of the American Digest System.”46 Although only a few “ever truly mastered 
                                                 
In 1901, the Harvard Law Review published a short review of recent advance sheets of Lawyers’ Co-op’s 
General Digest and West’s American Digest, finding them to fail in “furnishing an index of current case law.” 
Book Review, General Digest, American and English, BiMonthly Advance Sheets (June 1901); American Digest, 
Advance Sheets (June 1901), 15 Harv. L. Rev. 245, 245 (1901).  The reviewer’s harshest criticisms regarded the 
digests’ arrangement: 
Nor is the arrangement of these works well adapted to an index. In an orderly statement of legal principles 
the number of main divisions is comparatively few. An index of this kind, however, aiming not to state 
principles but to afford access to scattered cases and discussions, for its different purpose requires a different 
arrangement. One consults it to find material in the volumes indexed bearing upon-some particular point. 
He thinks of that point by its special name, and not by the name of that large division of the law under which 
it may belong in a scientific classification. 
Id. at 245–46. 
41 Berring, Full-Text Databases, supra note 7 at 32. 
42 Id. at 54. 
43 Robert C. Berring, Ring Dang Doo, 1 Green Bag 2d 3, 3 (1997). Berring noted that the “confluence” of 
Blackstone’s scientific structure of the law, the curriculum of modern legal education that developed in the last 
quarter of the nineteenth century at Harvard, and the West Digest System all contributed to what came to be seen 
as an inevitable way to classify legal concepts. The conceptual universe “present[ed] itself as the law.” Berring, 
Thinkable Thoughts, supra note 36 at 311. See also Hanson, supra note 13 at 570 (noting that “[t]he basic first-
year law school curriculum … was designed according to the same basic categories of law that informed the West 
digest.”). 
At about the same, Gregory Alexander expressed similar ideas regarding the general power of categorical 
systems: “By ‘making sense’ of the vast content of the legal system, they direct our attention and shape our 
perception of legal norms. ... The order that they impose on legal concepts reflects what we can loosely call a 
world-view, i.e., a coherent bundles [sic] of beliefs about the legal system and society in general.” Alexander, 
supra note 36 at 314.  
44 Robert C. Berring, Legal Information and the Search for Cognitive Authority, 88 Cal. L. Rev. 1673, 1693 
(2000) [hereinafter Berring, Cognitive Authority] . 
45 Id. at 1694. 
46 Id. at 1693. 
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the Digest System… [t]he average practitioner learned how to work with parts of the system. She 
discovered how to use the available Key Number tags in a rudimentary way, and it was fine.”47 
Berring’s thoughts about the influences of the digest system on the thinking of American 
lawyers were echoed in the work of other writers exploring how free-text online systems such as 
Lexis and Westlaw would impact lawyers’ research practices. Together with works by 
contemporaries Ethan Katsh, Dan Dabney, Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic, Steve Barkan, 
and others, Berring’s writings form a core body of literature that must be considered by anyone 
hoping to write seriously about the history and role of legal information in the United States.48  
His ideas have also continued to resonate in the works of many later writers, some of whom 
have described the extent of the digest’s influences in categorical terms.49 In 1993, the first 
Research Agenda of the American Association of Law Libraries included a topic which assumed 
that print digests had been influential in the development of American law: “What will be the 
                                                 
47 Id. at 1693, 1694.  
48 See generally Danner, Development of American Law, supra note 6.  
49 Barbara Bintliff, From Creativity to Computerese: Thinking Like a Lawyer in the Computer Age, 88 Law. Libr. 
J. 338, 341(1996) ([hereinafter, Bintliff, Creativity]) (“The classification scheme used by West has organized the 
law, and guided our thinking, since 1896.”); Carol M. Bast & Ransford C. Pyle, Legal Research in the Computer 
Age: A Paradigm Shift, 93 Law Libr. J. 285, 287 (2001)(“ the digest classification scheme is learned by successive 
generations of law school students; this comprehensive classification of the law underlies the attorney's approach 
to the law.”); Sabrina Sondhi, Should We Care If the Case Digest Disappears?: A Retrospective Analysis and the 
Future of Legal Research Instruction, Legal Reference Services Q. 263, 265(2009)(“Because law students and 
practitioners used the West key number digests to parse and understand legal precedent, the West organizational 
structure shaped their general thinking about law itself [and] helped shape the law by virtue of being the 
conceptual framework by which lawyers and judges thought about issues.”). 
See also Patti Ogden, Mastering the Lawless Science of Our Law: A Story of Legal Citation Indexes, 85 Law 
Libr. J. 1, 44 (1993) (“The creaky West Digest system … is grounded in the notion that there is an underlying 
structure of American law. Some argue that there is no structure other than that imposed over the years by the 
West editors.”)(citing Berring); Jill Anne Farmer, A Poststructuralist Analysis of the Legal Research Process, 85 
Law Libr. J. 391, 397 (1993) (West’s “process has had an enormous impact on legal scholarship, so much so that 
‘the National Digest system [sic] has molded and narrowed the way we conceptualize law.’”) (quoting Berring & 
Kathleen Vanden Heuvel); George S. Grossman, supra note 15 at 79 (“The systematization involved in the West 
key-number system may be largely responsible for rendering the common law manageable enough to survive in 
the United States.”)(citing Berring); David G. Post, Plugging In, The Law is Where You Find It, American Lawyer, 
Mar. 1996, available at http://www.temple.edu/lawschool/dpost/Where.html (the West digest system “was far 
more than just a convenient way to find the law; in many ways it was the law.… [U]nlike most maps it actually 
helped to shape the very features of the landscape that it was supposedly mapping.”)(citing Berring); Samuel E. 
Trosow, The Database and the Fields of Law: Are There New Divisions of Labor, 96 Law Libr. J. 63, 66 (2004) 
(“Berring argues that the impact of databases like LexisNexis and Westlaw is much deeper in that it involves a 
change in the structure of the legal literature.”); Spencer L. Simons, Navigating through the Fog: Teaching Legal 
Research and Writing Students to Master Indeterminacy through Structure and Process, 56 J. Legal Educ. 356, 
360 (2006)(“Robert Berring argued that the hierarchical taxonomy of the Digest System had actually become the 
American lawyer's mental model of the law.…”); Barbara Bintliff, Context and Legal Research, 99 Law Libr. J. 
251 (2007)(“Bob Berring writes of how the grand hierarchical scheme imposed on American law by the digest 
system developed by the West Publishing Company structured the research and analysis processes of generations 
of lawyers and actually shaped the substantive law over time.”); Hanson, supra note 13 at 570 (“The key number 
system in particular, Berring argues, enjoyed a significance extending far beyond mere case retrieval.”); Matthew 
C. Cordon, Task Mastery in Legal Research Instruction; 103 Law Libr. J. 403 (2011) (“Berring commented in 
1994 that digital information would cause the legal research universe to collapse. Most of this universe was based 
on the West Digest System, which created the hierarchical structure that not only established the basic means of 
organization of case law, but also ‘remade the structure of legal thinking….’”). 
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effects of increased reliance on electronic research on the development of the law, once researchers 
are no longer tied to the structures of the digest and other indexing systems?”50   
 
IV. The Challenges of Berring’s Ideas 
 
A. The Influences of Electronic Research Tools 
Berring’s thesis regarding the influences of the digest and other forms of legal publication on 
the law and American lawyers is appealing and well-grounded in his extensive knowledge of 
nineteenth and early twentieth century legal history.  But did he prove his thesis?  In 2004 Jim 
Milles wrote that “Berring has exhaustively demonstrated the influence of print-based 
classification schemes, particularly the West digest system … on American law….”51   Yet, 
Berring wrote little about how practicing lawyers used West digests, or how those uses served to 
influence their thinking. How does one show what influences research tools might have on 
lawyers’ thinking about the law at any time, either at the start of the West era or during the late 
twentieth century when print digests began  to be bypassed in favor of electronic tools? 
Some contemporary commentators questioned whether print research tools could have had the 
degree of influence Berring and others suggested.  In 1994, Nazareth Pantaloni observed the 
growing consensus about the importance of legal research tools in the development of the law and 
warned against attributing too much power to the roles of indexes and digests in molding the law.52 
After examining how indexes are used in other disciplines, Pantaloni concluded that “perceptions 
of the influence of indexes on the law suffers [sic] from the same notion of technological 
determinism that plagues the writing about legal databases. While legal indexes may have 
influenced the conceptual coherence of the law, they are as much a product as a progenitor of that 
conceptual structure.”53  
Responding to concerns about the impacts of free text electronic searching, Pantaloni cautioned 
that “[t]o suggest that the absence of indexes will undermine the structural coherence of the law 
ascribes too much significance to indexes and fails to recognize other normalizing practices in the 
law.”54  
In 2002, Richard Ross expressed similar cautions regarding claims about the impacts of print 
on past development of the law and predictions about the possible effects of electronic media on 
its future. 55  Although Ross did not discuss Berring’s work, his review of other scholarship is 
important to discussion of Berring’s ideas. Reviewing works by Ethan Katsh and by K.L. Collins 
and David Skover, Ross placed those authors within “a particular theoretical tradition” which 
                                                 
50 Nancy C. Carter, AALL Research Agenda and Grants Program, 25 AALL Newsl. 92, 92 (1993). 
51 James G. Milles, Leaky Boundaries and the Decline of the Autonomous Law School Library, 96 Law Libr. J. 
387, 410 n.139 (2004). 
52 Nazareth A. M. Pantaloni, III, Legal Databases, Legal Epistemology, and the Legal Order, 86 Law Libr. J. 
679, 682 (1994).   
53 Id. at 698–99. 
54 Id. at 700 (citing Lloyd A. Fallers, Law without Precedent 35 (1969)).  
55 Richard J. Ross, Communications Revolutions and Legal Culture: An Elusive Relationship, 27 Law & Soc. 
Inquiry 637 (2002) (reviewing M. Ethan Katsh, The Electronic Media and the Transformation of Law (1989); M. 
Ethan Katsh, Law in a Digital World (1995); Ronald K.L. Collins & David M. Skover, Paratexts, 44 Stan. L. 
Rev. 509 (1992)). 
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assumed that computers and the Internet will have relatively direct, linear, powerful, and 
unmediated effects on legal thought and practice.”56  For Ross, scholars writing in this tradition 
tended to isolate “the medium as an independent variable that produces identifiable effects,” and 
failed to recognize that “[t]he effects of a medium prove difficult to extricate from the attributes 
and processes of the society in which is embedded.”57 A medium’s influences on society are “fully” 
a product of how the system is used in the society.58 
In 1995, anticipating the possible impacts of hypertext on legal research, Eugene Volokh 
suggested that technological change might not change the research process as much as some 
anticipated.  With hypertext: “You'll end up reading little about some things—the things you know 
already or the things that aren't relevant to your problem—and a lot about other topics in which 
you're more interested. Your experience will be tailored to your particular problem….”  Would 
this be a change?  Volokh thought not, adding:  
[P]eople—especially lawyers doing research—have always read books this way. Lawyers 
don't read treatises cover to cover. They find the chapter they need, maybe read some 
material at the beginning of the chapter, and then go to the subsection that's relevant to them. 
Even when reading cases, they often skip over some issues and go directly to others.59 
Volokh did not discuss case law research specifically, but his comments would seem to apply to 
lawyers’ use of digests as well as other print resources.  
B. How Do Lawyers Use  Digests? 
No one questions the power of the West classification system for locating cases or its 
importance as an indexing and organizing tool, especially for late nineteenth century lawyers faced 
with the burgeoning numbers of reported cases issued by growing numbers of American courts. 
Yet, it would seem that an argument claiming that the digest also influences lawyers’ thinking 
about the law should demonstrate how their use of the digest in conducting research influences 
them.   
In 1986, Berring succinctly described the now familiar West classification system:  
The Digest classified all areas of law into seven broad categories. These categories were 
then subdivided into some four hundred and thirty topics. Each topic was then further 
subdivided into subsections called “Key Numbers” (a trademarked term). These Key 
Numbers allowed the topic to be broken into as many subdivisions as were necessary to 
completely cover that area of the law. Eventually, a structure of subject headings was 
created which provided for every possible legal issue.60 
                                                 
56 Id. at 639. 
57 Id. at 647. 
58 Id. at 661. 
59 Eugene Volokh, Technology and the Future of Law, 47 Stan. L. Rev. 1375, 1392–93 (1995).  “[E]ven briefs 
usually have tables of contents and of authorities, precisely so readers may focus on the issues they find most 
important.” Id. at 1393 n.109.  
60 Berring, Full-Text Databases, supra note 7 at 31–32. 
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In 2000 he wrote that the average practitioner had not mastered the classification system, but knew 
how to use parts of it.61   But for the digest to influence a lawyer’s thinking, would not that lawyer 
need to be exposed to more of its classification structure than the parts needed to solve an immediate 
problem ? 
In 1996, Barbara Bintliff explained how the process of using the digest might influence a 
researcher: First, “[u]sing a combination of legal terminology and major ‘fact words,’ we located 
the key number suggested by the facts of our situation. Then, by sorting through brief descriptions 
of the many other cases included under that same point of law, we were able to identify the rule 
(or rules) which were applicable to our situation.”  To be effective, however, the researcher would 
then examine cases classified under related key numbers in order to gain “a better understanding 
of the context and nature of the rules.”62  In line with Berring’s thinking, Bintliff wrote: “To use 
the digest, you have to think in terms that match its organization; you have to think of rules and 
hierarchies. The digest's organization follows the same pattern as our legal reasoning process, and 
has almost come to be the physical manifestation of ‘thinking like a lawyer.’”63  
For Bintliff, the research process changed with the advent of computer-based legal research 
systems, which encouraged researchers to limit their research to the sorts of fact-based inquiries 
for which computers are best suited and discouraged them from looking beyond individual cases 
to see the context provided in the print digests: “It’s as if we completely forget our traditional legal 
reasoning training …. Once we have our list of fact-based case citations, we begin the task of 
harmonizing the rules they suggest, in effect devising a framework of facts. We never seem to 
consider locating the larger, existing framework of rules.”64 
In 1990 Peter Schanck had questioned whether practicing lawyers actually used the digest in 
the way Bintliff later described.65 Steve Barkan had cited Berring and others in an article discussing 
the applications of Critical Legal Studies to legal research for “solid claims that West helped shape 
the nature of American law” and suggested the need to examine more closely the relationships 
between legal information resources and the substantive development of the law.66  In reply, 
Schanck argued that Barkan’s (and Berring’s) positions regarding the impacts of digests and other 
tools were based on mistaken ideas about how attorneys actually conduct research. 67  Schanck 
                                                 
61 Berring, Cognitive Authority, supra note 44 at 1693, 1694. 
62 Bintliff, Creativity, supra note 49 at 342. 
63 Id. at 343. Comparing the print West digests to Westlaw in 1992, John Doyle described the tools available to 
the print digest user: “a topical arrangement (including topical cross-references), a scope note for each topic 
showing subject inclusions and related topics, a subdivision analysis for each topic, translation tables between 
reclassified topics, and a word index.” Doyle supra note 21 at 256. Bast and Pyle saw this process as time-
consuming: because the key number system is so deeply layered, “a researcher looking for a case first must locate 
the correct topic and then follow through all the layers in the outline before locating the case on point.” Bast & 
Pyle, supra note 49 at 290. 
64 Bintliff, Creativity, supra note 49 at 348.  
65 Peter C. Schanck, Taking Up Barkan's Challenge: Looking at the Judicial Process and Legal Research, 82 
Law. Libr. J. 19 (1990).  
66 Steven M. Barkan, Deconstructing Legal Research: A Law Librarian's Commentary on Critical Legal Studies  
79 Law. Libr. J. 617, 633 (1987) (citing Gilmore, supra note 21 at 58–59; Martin Mayer, The Lawyers 431 (1967); 
Robert B. Stevens, Law School: Legal Education in America from the 1850s to the 1980s, at 132–33 (1983); 
Berring, Full-Text Databases, supra note 7, at 32–34, 36). 
67 Barkan later suggested that Schanck’s disagreement might be with Berring’s writings on the role of the West 
digests, rather than with Barkan himself. Steven M. Barkan, Response to Schanck: On the Need for Critical Law 
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listed several reasons why “key numbers, headnotes, indexes, and so forth have had little or no 
impact on either the content of our law or our understanding of the legal system”: 
First, when conducting their research, attorneys tend to use more than one system, and 
often use several…. This approach tends to … to expose the researcher to a variety of 
nondigest classifications…. 
Second, I have met a number of lawyers who, for various reasons, claim never to use 
digests…. 
Third, lawyers tend to concentrate more on the facts of their cases than on abstract 
doctrines. In so doing, they prefer searching descriptive word indexes over topical analyses, 
and they search the indexes as much for factual terms as for legal concepts.68 
Fourth, my impression is that key number classifications have minimal influence over 
the way lawyers perceive the law, even in instances when they use digests exclusively. They 
will tend to scan all or most of the cases under several key numbers and, in the process, pay 
little attention to the designations assigned to the categories. They then organize the 
precedents according to the particularities of their own cases and develop arguments based 
on those precedents. By this final stage, the West structure is long forgotten and its effects 
negligible.69 
Schanck admitted that his claims were based largely on his own experiences.  He also failed to 
consider other scholarship which suggested that lawyers and others might not always be conscious 
of the influences of their tools.70 Yet, his alternative view to those of Berring and later Bintliff 
regarding how lawyers used digests in practice made it harder to see how digests might influence 
lawyers’ thinking.  Schanck also underlined the need to better understand how lawyers use those 
tools before drawing conclusions about their influences.  Barkan himself had pointed out that 
“[r]emarkably little…has been written about these subjects,”71 a comment which echoed Morris 
Cohen’s broader 1969 statement “that we know a great deal about the materials of legal research, 
… but almost nothing about the actual procedures used by lawyers in their search into the law.”72   
In fact, much of the published literature on legal research has focused less on efforts to 
understand how lawyers conduct research in practice than on collecting the opinions of law 
                                                 
Librarianship, or Are We All Legal Realists Now? 82 Law Libr. J. 23, 30 n.35 (1990) [hereinafter, Barkan, 
Response]. 
68 See also Post, supra note 49: 
[W]e all now [sic] that the most useful piece of information we can find is information on how the legal 
system has dealt with analogous constellations of facts in the past. That's the golden nugget, the case "on all 
fours" with the facts of our client's current situation from which we can make reasonably reliable predictions 
about what a court will do when faced with those facts. But, of course, that's precisely the kind of information 
that was virtually inaccessible under previously-existing retrieval systems. The indexers didn't index facts, 
they indexed propositions of law.  
69 Schanck, supra note 65 at 17–19. 
70 See e.g., Alexander, supra note 36 at 303. 
71 Barkan,  Response, supra note 67 at 633. 
72 Cohen, Research Habits, supra note 11 at 183. See also Stephanie Davidson, Way Beyond Legal Research: 
Understanding the Research Habits of Legal Scholars, 102 Law Libr. J. 561, 564 (2010) (“Law librarians have 
not yet fully explored how attorneys or legal scholars conduct legal research.)  See id. at n.11 for similar 
observations. 
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librarians, attorneys, and judges about which research skills are most important and whether or not 
newer attorneys possess them.73 Although some newer empirical studies indicate that we will know 
more about lawyers’ research practices going forward,74 there is nothing comparable for the past. 
 
V. The Legal Environment of the Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Century 
It is difficult to do more than speculate about how lawyers used print digests and what 
influences the digest classification system might have had on their thinking about the law.  This is 
particularly true for the long-ago period in which the American Digest and the West classification 
system were introduced to American lawyers. Yet, placing the question in historical perspective 
lends some insight into how lawyers of the time approached case law research. Three aspects of 
the late nineteenth century legal environment are particularly instructive: (1) contemporary 
concerns regarding the phenomenon known as the “case lawyer”; (2) the bar’s discussions about 
the purposes of classification of the law; and (3) what West’s own representatives said about how 
to use its digests.  An examination of each suggests that the bar was interested mostly in locating 
cases specifically on point to support their arguments in the problem at hand.  
A. The Cases and The Facts  
Some sense of how nineteenth century print-era lawyers approached their research might be 
gained by looking briefly at the history of the term “case-lawyer,” which appeared in Anglo-
American legal journals throughout the nineteenth century and into the twentieth.  Occasionally, 
                                                 
73 The literature is well-reviewed in Patrick Meyer, Law Firm Legal Research Requirements for New 
Attorneys,101 Law Libr. J. 297, 302–10 (2009); see also Paul Douglas Callister, Beyond Training: Law 
Librarianship's Quest for the Pedagogy of Legal Research Education, 95 Law Libr. J. 7, 9–11 (2003). For a list 
of papers applying empirical research into legal research and other law-related information behavior, see Robert 
Richards, Legal Information Systems and Legal Information Resources: Information Behavior (Selected), 
http://www.personal.psu.edu/rcr5122/InformationBehavior.html (last visited Nov. 20, 2013).  Richards’ list 
suggests that the surveys reported by Cohen in 1969 are perhaps the earliest empirical studies of how lawyers 
conduct research. 
74 In 2009 Judith Lihosit published a suggestive discussion of present research practices, based on interviews with 
a small group of San Diego attorneys. Judith Lihosit, Research in the Wild: CALR and the Role of Informal 
Apprenticeship in Attorney Training, 101 Law Libr. J. 157 (2009). Lihosit’s interviewees did not use print digests 
and only “loosely” used their online equivalents, leading her to conclude that the digest did not play “an important 
role in helping attorneys determine the controlling legal concepts and principles in the cases they handle…. 
attorneys develop their knowledge base from distributed social networks, … the present-day manifestation of the 
apprenticeship system, rather than from any individual and controlled textual source such as the digest.” Id. at 
258. In 2010, Joe Custer published the results of a survey of Kansas lawyers and law faculty, intended to test 
Schanck’s arguments.  Although Custer viewed the results as supporting Schanck’s contention that the digest was 
less influential than some had claimed, he also noted shortcomings in his methodology. Joseph A. Custer, The 
Universe of Thinkable Thoughts versus the Facts of Empirical Research, 102 Law Libr. J. 251, 264–65 (2010). 
Lee Peoples has tested law students’ effectiveness in locating legal rules and cases using print digests and 
electronic tools. Lee F. Peoples, The Death of the Digest and the Pitfalls of Electronic Research: What is the 
Modern Researcher to Do, 97 Law Libr. J. 661 (2005). Michelle Wu and Leslie Lee have reported on which 
sources law students consult first to locate particular types of information. Michelle M. Wu & Leslie A. Lee, An 
Empirical Study on the Research and Critical Evaluation Skills of Law Students, 31 Legal Reference Services Q. 
205, 212 (2012).  The 2012 survey reported by Lastres suggested that digests were little used by younger 
associates in law firms of law firms of small and large size. Lastres, supra note 1 at 5.  The ABA Legal Technology 
Resource Center’s annual survey, supra note 3, provides regular updates on lawyers’ approaches to their research.  
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it was used to praise individual lawyers or judges and their approaches to practice.   The good case 
lawyer not only knew the cases, but also how to apply them; he was “capable, first, of cracking 
the judicial nut itself, and, then, of using its contents effectively.”75 In 1869, Justice Samuel Miller 
advised new law school graduates not to allow “fear of being called a case lawyer” to deter them 
“from the fullest investigation of every thing bearing on the case in hand.76 
By the time Justice Miller spoke, however, the term was being used more often in 
disparagement than as praise. Journal articles published in 1851 pointed out that a “mere case 
lawyer” would neither be interested in a book describing the state of the law at an earlier time,77 
nor in journals that were “not confined strictly to what the mere plodding case lawyer would 
denominate legal Subjects.”78  Another defined “case lawyer” as “a synonym for a narrow-minded, 
short-sighted pettifogger,” whose “practice of reasoning from cases instead of from principles … 
degrades the profession, and fills the law with absurdities and injustice.”79     
Robert Ferguson has suggested that, as the amount of case law began to accumulate in mid-
century, American lawyers were forced to shift from reliance on general principles to what 
Ferguson called “textbook law,” and to change how they approached their work: 
The early lawyer searched for a declaration derived from common usage and consistent 
with nature.  His successor, the reader of case reports, thought in terms of the specific 
commands that society had placed upon itself.  Each had a particular approach to the printed 
page.  The first looked for connections and resemblance; the second, for distinction and 
precision.80 
For Ferguson, lawyers who began practice in the 1840s and after “began to accept the overriding 
complexity of the law as an intellectual norm. … It was enough to find the detail and application 
of the law without worrying about comprehensiveness and theoretical compatibilities.”81   
After the Civil War, case lawyers were frequently criticized for their dedication to locating 
precedents directly on point with their cases without understanding the principles behind the 
decisions well enough to apply them to sets of facts not covered by direct precedents. Commenting 
later on the decline of the legal profession, John Dos Passos said of the case lawyer: 
He knows little of elementary law, but he carries, as a soldier would a knapsack, a memory 
filled with sections of codes and adjudicated cases. A legal combat now consists of hurling 
provisions of the Code and "pat" precedents at each other. Hence the modern advocate's 
nose is always to be found in a digest, “case”-law accumulating so fast that he must have 
                                                 
75 The Civil Code of the State of New York, No. II, 2 Alb. L.J. 408, 409 (1870). 
76 The Study and Practice of the Law, 2 Chi. Legal News 82, 82 (1869) (Address of Hon. Samuel F. Miller to the 
Graduates of the Law Department of Iowa University, 1869).   
77 Notes, 13 Monthly L. Rep. 322, 322 (1850–1851). 
78 Jurisdiction of the Law, 10 Am. L.J. 424, 424 (1851). 
79 Nature and Method of Legal Studies, 3 U.S. Monthly L. Mag. 491, 511 (1851). 
80 Robert A. Ferguson, Law And Letters in American Culture 200 (1984).  
81 Id. at 287. 
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indices to search for his precedents. Poor soul! if he cannot find a precedent, he is in a 
terrible sweat.82 
From West Publishing Company’s perspective, the primary value of comprehensive 
publication of judicial opinions and digests was that it enabled lawyers to find all cases on point 
to their research.  As part of an 1889 American Law Review symposium of law publishers, John 
B. West said that when lawyers ask: “What is the law on this point? ... Is it not the function and 
calling of the law publisher to supply the lawyers with mechanical aids toward answering the 
question in whatever connection it arises.”83  He continued: “I believe it is the principal business 
of American law publishers, to enable the legal profession to examine the American case law on 
any given subject, as easily, exhaustively, and economically as possible.”84  In 1892 the president 
of the ABA, Emlin McClain, stated his agreement, noting that the “practical lawyer” looks 
especially “to find the adjudications involving facts similar to those of his case....”85  To locate 
those adjudications, “the constant business of the lawyer is to search text-books, digests and 
indexes.”86   
John West believed that the problems involved in those searches had been minimized by the 
National Reporter System and its accompanying digests: “[t]he profession have now the immense 
advantage of being able to turn to a single set of reports and digests, and be sure of finding 
everything which the courts have said on any given subject up to the last decision just rendered.”87 
 Prominent lawyers voiced regrets over the changes they saw in the practice of American law 
as lawyers tried to deal with the ever-growing numbers of published decisions.  Nineteenth century 
case lawyers (and “case judges”)88 were seen not only as placing more emphasis on precedent than 
principle, but also as being more concerned with the facts of earlier cases than on the law they 
expressed. In 1892, McClain noted that:  
It is undoubtedly true that the practical lawyer is likely to attach too much importance to 
superficial similarity of facts in seeking cases which shall serve his purpose.… But after 
all, he does properly seek cases "on all fours" and value them more highly than those 
having only three points in common, involving, therefore, an argument as to whether the 
fourth is material. Three legs, it is well-known, furnish a less reliable support than four.89  
McClain’s point was illustrated in an 1888 review of a new digest which suggested that case 
lawyers would be better called “fact lawyers” because of their obsession with finding precedential 
                                                 
82 John R. Dos Passos, The American Lawyer As He Was—As He Is—As He Can Be 13–14 (1907).  In a 1914 
memoir, New York lawyer Theron G. Strong noted that “the large number of adjudged cases contained in the 
reports has virtually transformed the profession from a class of lawyers able to practice without law books to a 
class almost entirely dependent on the adjudged cases.” Theron G. Strong, Landmarks of a Lawyer's Lifetime 427 
(1914). 
83 Symposium of Law Publishers, 23 Am. L. Rev. 396, 400 (1889) (written comments of George Soule, John B. 
West, and James E. Briggs).  
84 Id. at 401. 
85 Emlin McClain, Classification of the Law for Lawyers, 26 Am. L. Rev, 223, 223 (1892). 
86 Id. at 224. 
87 Symposium, supra note 83 at 403. 
88 See Case Dependence in Judicial Opinions, 18 Law Notes 182 (1915) (“We have heard much about the case 
lawyer. Shall we be guilty of lese-majesty if we say there are also case judges?”). 
89 McClain, supra note 85 at 223–24. 
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cases with facts similar (or preferably identical) to their own cases.  The reviewer found that the 
new digest would allow a lawyer to “fish in this ocean of decisions for what the hoosiers call ‘hog 
cases,’—cases which decide the same facts as the case in which he is counsel, and in a way 
favorable to his client.”90  In 1898, a review of a collection of negligence cases pointed out the 
benefits of one feature: a table of cases classified by type of accident that “will delight the purely 
case lawyer.”  The review elaborated on the hog case example, relating the story of “a country 
lawyer in Indiana at an early day,” who represented the plaintiff in an action of replevin for a hog. 
His opponent read “a case on all fours with the case at bar.” When he had finished, the plaintiff's 
lawyer argued: 
“This case is of no authority for the decision of the case before the court. This was a 
lawsuit about a cow. The case before the court is a lawsuit about a hog.” Then, turning to 
the defendant's lawyer with a sneer, he said: “Bring us a Hog case.” The learned justice 
ruled that the point was well taken and gave judgment for the defendant [sic]. The moral 
of this is that, to the case lawyer and the case judge it is not enough to satisfy the doctrine 
of stare decisis that two cases are “on all fours with each other;” they must both be “hog 
cases.” The object of this classified table of cases is to give the strictly case lawyer a “hog 
case.”91  
Whether accurately reported or not, the hog case stories clearly indicate the importance of fact-
based research for lawyers of the period.  In 1907, New York State Law Librarian Frank B. Gilbert 
noted that the lawyer of the time knew the facts of the case and in “this immense maze of reported 
judicial determinations he may well think there is a case with facts like his which, if found, will 
be conclusive upon the tribunal which he seeks to convince.92  
Although many commentators decried the case lawyer, others recognized that, faced with the 
ever-increasing number of published cases, attorneys had no choice but to become case lawyers 
for fear that their opponents would find unfamiliar precedents that they could not counter.  J.J. 
Willett told the Alabama Bar Association in 1893 that he had once viewed the lawyer who needed 
“a case to fit a case,” to be an “inferior lawyer.” However, experience had taught him that “the 
case lawyer is the most successful lawyer we have, and our most successful lawyers are getting to 
be nothing more than case lawyers.”93 Arkansas judge U.M. Rose noted in an 1896 talk before the 
Virginia State Bar Association that, while “case lawyer” was once a term of reproach,  
                                                 
90 Book Review: The Complete Digest 1887, Part 1, 22 Am. L. Rev. 952, 953 (1888). 
91 Book Review, American Negligence Cases; American Negligence Reports: Current Series, 32 Am. L. Rev. 479, 
480 (1898).  (The story makes more sense if judgment had been entered for the plaintiff.)  In similar fashion, a 
dissenting Louisiana judge explained why the lawyers in an unnamed “Western state” referred to precedential 
cases not as “on all fours,” but as “goose” cases: 
The expression arose from the perplexity of a so-called 'case lawyer,' who was unprepared to advise his 
client whether he was liable in damages because his geese had trespassed on his neighbor's lawn. The lawyer 
said he had found several cases where the owners were held liable because their horses, cows, sheep, goats, 
or dogs had committed acts of trespass; but he could not find a “goose case.” The distinction which he 
observed was that his “goose case” was not “on all fours.”  
O'Neill, J., dissenting, Taylor v. Allen, 151 La. 82, 118, 91 So. 635, 648 (1921). 
92 Frank B. Gilbert, The Law Library: Address at a Joint Session [of AALL] with the American Library 
Association, 1 Index to Legal Periodicals and Law Libr. J. 6, 9 (1908). 
93 J.J. Willett, The Case Lawyer, 1 Am. Law. 36, 36 (1893) (Transactions of the Sixteenth Annual Meeting of the 
Ala. Bar Ass’n). 
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now we are all either case lawyers, or are not lawyers at all. … Our legal arguments are 
for the most part a mere casino-like matching and unmatching of cases, involving little or 
no intellectual effort. The law is ceasing to be a question of principles, and is becoming a 
mere question of patterns.94 
Rose’s remarks would be echoed in Barbara Bintliff’s later comments on the effects of computer-
based systems on the research process.95 
The case lawyer’s situation was perhaps best captured in an 1916 address by Solicitor General 
John W. Davis.  Speaking before the Judicial Section of the ABA,96 Davis quoted from a recent 
opinion that described the current bar as “an industrious, painstaking, far-reaching army of sleuths 
of the type of Sherlock Holmes, hunting some precedent in some case, confidently assured that if 
the search be long enough and far enough some apparently parallel case may be found to justify 
even the most absurd and ridiculous contention.”97 
But Davis justified the lawyers’ need to consider all published cases because of the courts’ 
reliance on the binding force of judicial precedents: As a result, “the case lawyer … is not wholly 
a self-made man…. He is rather the product of an environment and of circumstances which he is 
powerless of his own motion to change or greatly modify.”98  Davis summarized the case lawyer’s 
dilemma: 
Does not the case for the case lawyer come to this: that so long as the law is based upon 
precedents, so long as judges multiply them, and so long as printing presses issue them, 
just so long will the case lawyer spend his time in their collection, and just so long will he 
belabor the courts with the fagots he has thus industriously bound?99  
Faced with an increase from fewer than 1,000 volumes of published reports in 1850 to 11,500 by 
the time Davis spoke in 1916, how could lawyers not focus their research on finding cases directly 
on point to their problems, as efficiently as possible?     
 Expressions of nineteenth century concerns about the case lawyer suggest that American 
lawyers have long concentrated their research on locating cases on point to an immediate problem, 
rather than developing knowledge regarding the principles behind the cases.   
 
                                                 
94 U.M. Rose, The Present State of the Law, 2 Va. L. Reg. 651, 656 (1897). 
95 See Bintliff, Creativity, supra note 49 at 348. 
96 John W. Davis, The Case for the Case Lawyer, 39 Ann. Rep. A.B.A. 757 (1916), reprinted at 3 Mass. L.Q. 99 
(1918).  
97State v. Rose, 106 N.E. 50, 52 (Ohio 1914), quoted in id. at 758. 
98 Davis, supra note 96 at 759. 
99 Id. at 761.  Speaking to an audience of judges, Davis suggested that the judiciary write fewer full opinions, 
write shorter opinions, publish them more selectively, and cite fewer cases in their opinions. Id. at 767–68. He 
concluded with the admonishment: “the problem I am suggesting is yours and not another’s.  The remedy for 
these complaints, if there be one, must be one of your own devising.” Id. at 768. 
Speaking as president of the ABA in 1923, Davis hailed the creation of the American Law Institute, noting 
that escape from the “Serbonian bog” of the published law could likely be found “only in a frequent reversion to 
general principles, stated with the utmost simplicity and invested with all the authority that can be attained short 
of statutory enactment.” John W. Davis, Address of the President, 46 Ann. Rep. A.B.A. 193, 196 (1923). 
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B. Classification and the ABA 
 
Discussions about classification and arrangement of law were common among American 
lawyers from the last decades of the nineteenth century into the twentieth.100  Gregory Alexander 
argues that the interest in classification during this period stemmed from several factors: the sense 
that the common law lacked a workable organization, which was more apparent after the 
procedural reforms of the mid-nineteenth century; the thought that classification of the law could 
be the means for law reform; and the notion that classifications attempted by late century treatises 
writers were inadequate.101  Legal academics provided much of the leadership in these 
discussions,102 but the organized bar also brought its concerns about the burgeoning number of 
published decisions into play.103   
At the second meeting of the American Bar Association in 1879, Edward J. Phelps used an 
address on the career of John Marshall to point out that: “[p]erplexed as the law has become with 
infinite legislation, confused and distracted with a multitude of incongruous and inconsistent 
precedents that no man can number, it is a different system now, although still the same in name, 
from that which Marshall dealt with.”104 An 1884 address by John Dillon on American Institutions 
                                                 
100 See Alexander, supra note 36 at 304, 306 (noting discussions in contemporary treatises, and among academics 
and elite lawyers).  Alexander refers to 1870–1920 as the “classical” period, defining the term to include “all legal 
writers who contributed to the classification enterprise.”  Id. at 304 n.5. See also Jay M. Feinman, The 
Jurisprudence of Classification, 41 Stan. L. Rev. 661, 663 n.4 (1989) (summarizing the legal classification 
literature). 
101 Alexander supra note 36 at 310–13 (drawing on Thomas Grey, Langdell’s Orthodoxy, 45 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 1, 
47–50 (1983)).  On the effects of nineteenth century procedural reforms, see Joseph Lavitt, Leaving Contemporary 
Legal Taxonomy, 90 Denver U. L. Rev. 213, 240–55 (2012). 
In 1888, Justice Miller found that “[m]ost of these modern treatises … though professing to be classified and 
arranged in reference to certain principles discussed in the book, they are generally but ill-considered extracts 
from the decisions of the courts.” Samuel F. Miller, The Use and Value of Authorities, 23 Am. L. Rev. 165, 165 
(1889). Roscoe Pound found that the change from the doctrinally rich early nineteenth century treatises to books 
providing “mere key[s] to the cases” made the post-Civil War period “the nadir of American law book writing.” 
Roscoe Pound, The Formative Era of American Law 157 (1938).  
Late nineteenth and early twentieth century writings on legal classification include: McClain, supra note 85; 
Russell H. Curtis, Classification of Law, Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Mar. 
1894, at 42; Charles C. Lester, Subject Classification of Reported Cases, 20 Yale L.J. 372 (1911); Henry T. Terry, 
Arrangement of the Law, 15 Ill. L. Rev. 61 (1920); Arthur L. Corbin, Terminology and Classification in 
Fundamental Jural Relations, 4 Am. L. Sch. Rev. 607 (1921); Roscoe Pound, Classification of Law, 5 Am. L. 
Sch. Rev. 269 (1924)(address at the 21st annual meeting of the Association of American Law Schools; a 
discussion of the address appears in Meeting of the American Association of Law Schools—1923, 5 Am. L. Sch. 
Rev. 299, 321–23 (1924)); Roscoe Pound, Classification of Law, 37 Harv. L. Rev. 933 (1924); Albert Kocourek, 
Classification of Law, 11 N.Y.U. L.Q. Rev. 319 (1934); Albert Kocourek, Code and Digest, 18 Ill. L. Rev. 1024 
(1934); Charles C. Ulrich, Proposed Plan of Classification for the Law, 4 Mich. L. Rev. 226 (1935); Urban A. 
Lavery, Finding the Law: Legal Classification in America—1880–1940, 25 A.B.A. J. 383 (1939); Jerome Hall, 
Some Basic Questions Regarding Legal Classification for Professional and Scientific Purposes, 5 J. Legal Educ. 
329 (1953); Feinman, supra note 100.  For an insightful discussion of classification as applied to law books, see 
the chapter: “Arrangement of Material in Law Books,” in Hicks, Materials and Methods, supra note 11 at 190. 
102 Alexander supra note 36 at 308 (listing prominent legal academics interested in questions of classification).  
103 See Report of the Committee on Jurisprudence and Law Reform, 2 Ann. Rep. A.B.A. 193, 203–04 (1879).  The 
bar’s concerns with the number of published reports would be discussed in speeches and other forums of the ABA 
and state bar associations for the next forty years. For a summary of the ABA’s activities regarding this matter, 
see Richard A. Danner, The ABA, the AALL, and the AALS, and the “Duplication of Legal Publications,” 104 
Law Libr. J. 489–92 (2012). 
104 E.J. Phelps, Annual Address, 2 Ann. Rep. A.B.A. 173, 175 (1879). 
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and Laws sparked the Association’s nascent interest in the impacts on American lawyers of what 
he termed the “multitudinous mass of decisions,”105 by articulating his fear that the growing burden 
of too many cases would cause the common law system to “break down under its own ever-
increasing and insupportable weight,” eliminate the doctrine of precedent from American law and 
substitute the continental system, superseding the law reports by codification.106  In 1886, Dillon 
delivered a paper requested by the Committee on Judicial Administration on “Law Reports and 
Law Reporting,” in which he noted that “[t]here is no reason to doubt that the judicial reports will 
continue to increase as rapidly as ever, adding to the bulk and, to some extent, to the uncertainty 
of the law, and this will go on and on until the effect becomes at length insupportable.”107   
In 1888, the ABA received a letter from Henry T. Terry, a New York lawyer and author, calling 
for an authoritative “complete scientific arrangement of the whole body of the law.”108  Terry 
argued that a classification project prepared under the authority of the ABA would both have 
practical benefits for the practicing bar and provide a frame-work to guide the future development 
of the law in a principled manner, while keeping it manageable and knowable.109  For Terry, the 
practical end of making the law easier to find could not be accomplished unless “the arrangement 
possesses those characteristics which make it what, for lack of a better word, we may call 
philosophical.”110  He argued that a scientific arrangement would “[e]specially … be of service in 
providing a sufficient, uniform and easily understood arrangement for the digests and indexes upon 
which we are more and more compelled to rely in preparing cases.”111  At present, effective use of 
available digests was frustrated by each compiler’s “use of his own peculiar scheme of 
arrangement,” and the practice of “taking as heads of classification some of the names of 
catchwords that have become at all familiar to lawyers and arranging them alphabetically.”112  As 
a result, it was “inevitable that, as we now are, a digest must be arranged largely on the ground of 
superficial resemblances between the external circumstances of cases or proximate or derivative 
rules, rather than ultimate principles, since the ultimate principles themselves are often not clearly 
recognized.”113 
Terry proposed that the ABA appoint a committee to solicit and consider various plans of 
arrangement.  Once adopted, the best plan would be published as an institutional work which 
“would take its place by the side of such books as Blackstone’s or Kent’s Commentaries, or rather 
would largely supersede them.”114  
                                                 
105 John F. Dillon, Annual Address: American Institutions and Laws, 7 Ann. Rep. A.B.A. 203, 227 (1884). 
106 Id. at 226.   
107 John F. Dillon, Law Reports and Law Reporting, 9 Ann. Rep. A.B.A. 257, 261 (1886). 
108 The letter was published in the following year’s proceedings with the report of the Special Committee.  See 
Letter from Henry T. Terry to the American Bar Association, Aug.1888, 12 Ann. Rep. A.B.A. 327 (1889). 
109 Id. at 330. 
110 Id. at 332.  In 1870 Holmes had written: “Law is not a science, but is essentially empirical.  Hence, although 
the general arrangement should be philosophical, even at the expense of disturbing prejudices, compromises with 
practical convenience are highly proper.” [Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.], Codes, and the Arrangement of the Law, 
5 Am. L. Rev. 1, 4 (1870). 
111 Terry, supra note 107 at 328. 
112 Id. at 328–29. 
113 Id. at 330. 
114 Id. at 338. 
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Terry’s letter and questions regarding “the arrangement of the law” were referred to a new 
Special Committee on the Classification of the Law.115 In 1891, the Special Committee reported 
on Terry’s proposal116 and the question of whether “an institutional work setting out the whole 
private and substantive law in some detail could be prepared under the direction of the 
Association.”117 
The Special Committee identified two primary purposes for classifying the law: one, to provide 
an orderly arrangement that would allow it to be comprehended as a whole; the other, to provide 
a convenient cataloging of the principle topics to collect authorities and allow precedents to be 
located.  Significantly, however, the Committee saw those purposes as “not necessarily 
consistent,” and concluded that “it will be found that they are not practically so.”118  The theoretical 
divisions of the law found in scientific classifications “are too general for practical use and…the 
practical arrangement of topics for encyclopedias, digests and indexs [sic] is too limited for the 
purposes of the jurist.”119  As a result, two classifications were needed and the practical 
classification consisting of “a well-defined list of topics or heads under which points decided by 
the courts may be arranged for convenient reference, is of the more general importance.”120  
The Committee thus rejected the connection that Terry had drawn between the scientific and 
practical benefits of classifying the law. It devoted the rest of its report to possible divisions for a 
theoretical classification of the law, which might be used to develop a more detailed scheme in the 
future.121 
                                                 
115 Transactions of the Eleventh Annual Meeting of the American Bar Association, 11 Ann. Rep. A.B.A. 9, 22 
(1888).  Beyond requesting that the letter be published and to be continued, the new special committee took no 
actions in 1889.  A draft report was circulated at that year’s meeting of the ABA, but not finished because of the 
death of the committee chair.  A new committee was appointed in 1890. Transactions of the Thirteenth Annual 
Meeting of the American Bar Association, 13 Ann. Rep. A.B.A. 3, 40–41 (1890). 
116 Transactions of the Fourteenth Annual Meeting of the American Bar Association, 14 Ann. Rep. A.B.A. 55 
(1891). 
117 Report of the Committee on Classification of the Law, 14 Ann. Rep. A.B.A. 379, 380 (1891)(hereinafter Report 
of the Committee on Classification of the Law (1891). 
118 Id. at 383. 
119 Id.  
120 Id. at 384.  For similar perspectives, see Frederick Pollock, Divisions of Law, 8 Harv. L. Rev. 187, 187 (1894) 
(“Practising lawyers do not concern themselves much with divisions of a high order of generality. They have to 
think, in the first place, of speedy and convenient reference, and the working arrangements of professional 
literature are made accordingly.”); Benjamin Tradwell, Suggestions for a Practical Digest, 3 Am. Law. 337, 338 
(1895) (describing the “philosophical” and “practical” modes of arrangement, and arguing that the best scheme 
brings the researcher “most speedily to the precise point in issue … the philosophical arrangement, counts for 
naught unless it accomplishes this.”); McClain, supra note85 at 223 (“the practical lawyer needs an arrangement 
of the law for a wholly different purpose and he is likely to ignore the theoretical classification as of no use to 
him whatever.”).  But see Seymour D. Thompson, Common Errors and Deficiencies in Law Reporting, 1 Green 
Bag 436, 441 (1889)(“we need a more scientific system of legal classification, which must be made as the 
preliminary to a better system of legal indexing.”).   
Dan Dabney describes these approaches to classification as the rational view, which has the goal of making 
the law intelligible, and the instrumental view, which has the goal of making the body of case law tractable. Email 
from Dan Dabney to Richard Danner (Nov. 5, 2013, 10:26 EST)(on file with author). 
121  Report of the Committee on Classification of the Law (1891), supra note 117 at 402–08.  
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In 1894, the ABA created a Special Committee on Law Reporting “to ascertain the condition 
of law reporting throughout the Union.”122 The following year, the new special committee initiated 
what would be an ongoing Committee interest in how and whether the available commercial 
digests helped lawyers confront the growing body of case law.  The report stated optimistically 
that: “the condition of affairs as to the multiplication of reported decisions, although discouraging, 
is very far from desperate [because d]igests ... have made it comparatively easy, considering the 
mass of decisions, to make an exhaustive investigation of any question.”123 
In 1895, the Special Committee on Law Reporting became a standing committee covering both 
reporting and digesting.124 By including digesting within the jurisdiction of the new standing 
committee, rather than that of the then-quiescent Special Committee on Classification, the ABA 
institutionalized the distinction between scientific or philosophical classification of the law on the 
one hand, and the more practical role of digest classifications on the other.125  The discussion 
closed with a motion that Austin Abbott, co-compiler with his late brother Benjamin Vaughan 
Abbott of the United States Digest, and “the man most competent in the United States for that 
purpose” be requested to work with the committee.126 
 The new Committee on Law Reporting and Digesting offered its next report in 1896.  
Although it was now “more than ever impressed with the difficulties arising from the number of 
reported cases, and particularly from the evils resulting from the duplication of reports of the same 
opinions,” the Committee acknowledged that it had not made satisfactory progress toward their 
solution, in part because of Austin Abbott’s death. 127   The report criticized current digests and 
indexes for inconsistency and poor arrangement,128 and argued that “a thorough and carefully-
compiled digest” was necessary.129 Although the existing digests “tend to uniformity,” a uniform 
                                                 
122 Transactions of the Seventeenth Annual Meeting of the American Bar Association, 17 Ann. Rep. A.B.A. 72–
73 (1894). 
123 Report of the Committee on Law Reporting, 18 Ann. Rep. A.B.A. 343, 356 (1895). 
124 Transactions of the Eighteenth Annual Meeting of the American Bar Association, 18 Ann. Rep. A.B.A. 30–31 
(1895). In proposing the change, Simeon Baldwin said: 
The importance of the subject of law reporting and law digesting, both to the bar and bench, cannot 
of course be over-estimated, and a standing committee reporting annually, if they saw occasion, 
could make recommendations for action from a higher and better vantage ground, and with a 
broader view of the subject than any special committee. 
Id. at 30. 
The ABA constitution approved in 1878 had provided for five standing committees; the Committee on Law 
Reporting and Digesting was the first additional standing committee.  Edson R. Sunderland, History of the 
American Bar Association and Its Work 21–22 (1953). 
125 The following year, Emlin McClain, chair of the Classification Committee, who was absent in 1895 
commented: 
I fancy that the functions of the two committees will not be found to conflict with each other for the reason 
that the Committee on law Reporting must necessarily have in mind rather indexing and digesting, while 
this Committee did not have that in mind as its fundamental or important subject, but rather the determination 
of the general headings under which particular subjects would be discussed. 
Transactions of the Nineteenth Annual Meeting of the American Bar Association, 19 Ann. Rep. A.B.A. 3, 17–18 
(1896). 
126 Id. at 43–44.  On the Abbotts, see Hicks, Materials and Methods, supra note 11 at 201–03.  Hicks gave the 
brothers “first credit for originating and developing the scheme of classification and the method of alphabetical 
arrangement now widely used in American encyclopedias and digests.”  Id. at 202. 
127 Report of Committee on Law Reporting and Digesting (1896), supra note 39 at 398.  
128 Id. at 400–02. 
129 Id. at 402. 
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official index could not be created “through private effort or enterprise,” but would require either 
the concerted action of the body of court reporters, perhaps brought together by the ABA, or a 
commission created by the federal government.130 
In 1898, after revisiting what it had said in 1895 and 1896, the Committee report stated that 
published reports “should be summarized and indexed under a common plan and so as to be readily 
accessible to all,”131  then discussed whether commercial publishers were meeting this need.  No 
individual publishers were named, but West Publishing Company was clearly referenced as “[t]he 
agency…by which the demand for a multiplicity of decisions has been increased, [and which] has 
in itself provided some remedy for the difficulties which have been created.” Turning from the 
more critical positions of its earlier reports, the Committee then stated: “we [now] have uniform 
systems of reporting and digesting common to all, and a basis, at least, of a common system which 
shall be satisfactory to all.”  As a result, there was no need for the bar or any official authority to 
be directly involved in the digesting of decisions.  Rather, “it is better [for lawyers] to avail 
themselves of the labors of private publishers who make it their business to ascertain and satisfy 
the needs of the profession.”132 
The bar’s role, then, would be to advise the publishers on improving methods of making reports 
and digests, encourage uniformity, and find ways to reduce the growth in published opinions.133  
For the Committee, “the hope of uniformity lies in the two series of digests of the reports of the 
whole country by which the bar of the whole country is now made acquainted with the decisions 
of all the courts alike.”134  Striking a blow for practicality, the Committee argued that: 
Whether these common plans are the best or not, it is by conforming to them, that we can 
the most easily reach uniformity, and if there are improvements to be suggested they 
should be directed towards the perfecting of these plans, and then we shall have a model 
to which all the local digests may readily conform.135 
The arrangement of the digest should be based not on “theoretical considerations,” but on “the 
habits of thought and the actual wants of the men who are to use it,”136 a position completely 
opposite to that expressed by Henry Terry in his 1888 letter to the ABA. For the Committee on 
Law Reporting and Digesting, because “[t]he purpose of a digest is to enable us to find the law 
contained in the reports … [i]t does not matter so much what plan of classification is adopted as 
that we shall know clearly what the plan is, and that the same plan is always followed.”137  In 1900, 
the Committee repeated its suggestion that “the system with which we are all equally familiar” be 
                                                 
130 Id. at 402–03. 
131 Report of Committee on Law Reporting and Digesting, 21 Ann. Rep. A.B.A. 437, 440 (1898). 
132 Id. at 441. 
133 Id. 
134 Id. at 448 (referring to West’s American Digest and Lawyers’ Cooperative’s General Digest, each of which 
used the West classification system). 
135 Id. The West Company viewed the Committee’s recognition as a formal endorsement by the ABA.  The 
company history tells how in 1897, John B. West had rushed a copy of the first volume of the Century Edition to 
the ABA meeting, where it “was the sensation of the meeting.  The American Bar Association at its next annual 
meeting, 1898, formally endorsed the American Classification Plan as the model for modern digesting.” Marvin, 
supra note 17 at 73–74. 
136Report of the Committee on Law Reporting and Digesting (1898), supra note 131 at 448. 
137 Id. at 449. 
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adopted in the states as the basis for “standard to which all the digests should substantially 
conform.”138 
The Special Committee on Classification of the Law languished for ten years after its 1891 
response to Terry’s proposal.139 It became more active briefly after the 1901 appointment to the 
committee of James DeWitt Andrews, who would be a prominent voice on questions of 
classification of law within and outside the ABA for the next twenty years.140 In 1902, his 
committee offered a fifty page report on “The Vocation of Legal Classification,” which Andrews 
described as suggesting “the salient features and controlling points of what must ultimately 
constitute the scheme of legal classification,” and proposed to submit a plan of classification to the 
Association the following year.141  In 1903, however, he reported that the Committee had been 
unable to meet and had no report to offer.142    
No report was offered again in 1904, but Andrews offered an oral report in 1905.  Noting the 
Committee’s beginning as a response to Terry’s letter, he concluded that in sixteen years it had 
accomplished little.143  Not only did the ABA not have the resources to carry out a classification 
project, but neither the bar nor the teachers of law had shown active interest in legal classification: 
I think it may be said that they do not fully perceive the intimate relations between 
classification of law and the primary, paramount object of this Association, namely 
the promotion of jurisprudence; … for until we have a systematic body of law 
systematized we cannot have a jurisprudence.144 
                                                 
138 Report of the Committee on Law Reporting and Digesting, 23 Ann. Rep. A.B.A. 376, 377 (1900). 
139 The Special Committee on Classification of the Law had failed to report again until 1896.  That year’s short 
report was a largely a gloss on the Committee’s intentions for the classification system it proposed in 1891, noting 
“that such a classification would not be found itself of much practical value, but that it would form a foundation 
on which an arrangement of subjects for practical purposes might be based.” Report of Committee on Expression 
and Classification of the Law, 19 Ann. Rep. A.B.A. 405, 405 (1896).  The Committee expressed hope that it could 
make at least a partial report on its continuing work by the next ABA meeting. Id. at 406. In 1898, the only 
committee member present at the ABA meeting told the assembly that he had “no report to make and the law will 
have to remain unclassified for another year.” Transactions of the Twenty-First Annual Meeting of the American 
Bar Association, 21 Ann. Rep. A.B.A. 3, 31 (1898). No written reports were offered 1897–1900.  
140 Andrews was a law teacher and writer, whose works included a lengthy elementary treatise on American 
jurisprudence: James DeWitt Andrews, American Law: A Commentary on the Jurisprudence, Constitution and 
Laws of the United States (1900). 
141 Transactions of the Twenty-Fifth Annual Meeting of the American Bar Association, 25 Ann. Rep. A.B.A. 3, 
22–23 (1902).  The purposes of classification should be:  
1. To bring to the surface the fundamental principles of our law and organize them into a system. 
2. To make the law more easily ascertainable (knowable). 
3. To make it more certain and clearly stated. 
4. To introduce a tendency toward uniformity which will ultimately result in practical uniformity. 
5. A condensation and reduction in the bulk of expressed law. 
6. To reduce the mass of statutes, decisions, constitutional rules and principles to a tangible, organized, 
manageable body. 
Report of Committee on the Classification of the Law, 25 Ann. Rep. A.B.A.425, 426 (1902). 
142 Transactions of the Twenty-Sixth Annual Meeting of the American Bar Association, 26 Ann. Rep. A.B.A. 3, 
94 (1903). 
143 Transactions of the Twenty-Eighth Annual Meeting of the American Bar Association, 28 Ann. Rep. A.B.A. 3, 
85 (1905). 
144 Id. 
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Previewing the themes he would develop a few years later outside the ABA in the American 
Corpus Juris project,145 Andrews showed little interest in the practical concerns that animated the 
Committee on Law Reporting and Digesting.  Rather, he argued that “classification is one of the 
essentials, if not the essential element of a highly developed jurisprudence,” and proposed that the 
matter of classification be referred to a joint committee of the Special Committee on Classification 
and the standing Committee on Jurisprudence and Law Reform.  His motion was adopted,146 but 
apparently received with little enthusiasm by the Committee on Jurisprudence.  In 1906, that 
committee’s report said simply that because classification was a matter “peculiarly appropriate to 
the Committee on Classification of the Law [it] will be reported by that committee.”147  The 
Classification Committee itself had no report to offer.148  By 1908 it had disappeared from the list 
of ABA Committees.149 
The ABA discussions involving classification of the law indicate that, after rejecting Henry 
Terry’s proposal for a single classification system to serve both the practical needs of the bar and 
develop a scientific or philosophical structure for American law, the bar’s primary interest was in 
the usefulness of classification systems to aid in the location of cases.  The classification itself 
need not be perfect as long as it worked.  As put by Benjamin Tradwell, “a digest … is after all 
only a labor-saving device.”150 The ABA’s favored approach to classification indicates that late 
nineteenth century practitioners had little interest in digest classification systems or the principles 
they embodied, other than as finding tools.   
 
 
                                                 
145 Readers of the February 1910 issue of The Green Bag found a 30 page article (plus appendix) by Philadelphia 
attorney Lucian Alexander on the need for what he labeled an American Corpus Juris, “a complete and 
comprehensive statement in adequate perspective of the entire body of American law.” Lucien Hugh Alexander, 
Memorandum in re Corpus Juris, 22 Green Bag 59, 59 (1910).  Alexander noted that the memorandum was a 
joint product with James DeWitt Andrews and George W. Kirchwey of the Columbia Law School.  For a brief 
history of the Corpus Juris project, see William P. LaPiana, “A Task of No Common Magnitude”: The Founding 
of the American Law Institute, 11 Nova L. Rev. 1085, 1107–09 (1987). 
146 Transactions (1905), supra note 192 at 87. 
147 Report of the Committee on Jurisprudence and Law Reform, 29 Ann. Rep. A.B.A. 481, 481 (1906). 
148 Transactions of the Twenty-Ninth Annual Meeting of the American Bar Association, 29 Ann. Rep. A.B.A. 3, 
32 (1906) (Statement of James D. Andrews). 
149 The issue would be raised again in 1916, when ABA President Elihu Root expressed concern about “[t]he vast 
and continually growing mass of reported decisions which afford authorities on almost every side of almost every 
question ….” He proposed that the Association “adopt the simple and natural course of avoiding confusion by 
classification, system, the understanding and application of generally recognized and accepted legal principles.  
Elihu Root, Address of the President: Public Service by the Bar, 39 Ann. Rep. A.B.A. 355, 364–65 (1916).  Root 
thus drew a connection between the lawyer’s practical problems maneuvering through the mass of precedent and 
classification of the law.  Classification would help the bar “to see through the precedents and the incidents to the 
controlling principles.” Id. at 365. 
A Special Committee to Consider Classification and Restatement of the Law was appointed in 1917.  By 
1923, after reporting on the organization and initial activities that year of the American Law Institute, it concluded 
that the ALI “seems in the way of accomplishing the reclassification and restatement of the law which this 
Association and this committee have long been working toward.”  Report of the Special Committee on the 
Classification and Restatement of the Law, 46 Ann. Rep. A.B.A. 364, 365 (1923). By 1925, the Special Committee 
had gone out of existence. 
150 Tradwell, supra note 120 at 337. 
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C. West’s Perspectives on How to Use the Digests 
 
In the early 1900s West Publishing Co. began to take an active role in educating law students 
and practitioners about effective use of its publications.151  West representatives began to visit law 
schools, and where allowed, offered lectures on topics of legal bibliography.152  What is probably 
the first legal research and writing text, Brief Making and the Use of Law Books,153 edited by the 
dean of the Stanford Law School, was issued in 1906.  Around the same time, two long-running 
West journals began publication.  The American Law School Review (1902–1947) was published 
as “An Intercollegiate Law Journal ” while West Publishing Company’s Docket (1909–1944) was 
aimed at a broader professional audience.154     
In 1903 and 1904 John Mallory published three articles in the American Law School Review 
describing the features and importance of the classification system that he developed for West.155  
Each article emphasized the importance of understanding the system in order to use the digests 
effectively.   In “The Use of Law Books,” Mallory pointed out that “[t]he great obstacle to a ready 
and successful use of digests is lack of practical knowledge of their arrangement and structure…. 
[O]ne needs to know the titles or headings under which he should look, the scope of each as 
compared with related topics, the methods of subdivision, the use of cross-references, etc…. Direct 
and systematic instruction in this practical part of his work would greatly aid the student.”156 In 
“Philosophical Classification of Law,” Mallory noted the importance of knowing “the terms in 
common use as main headings of the law and their subdivisions, … the scope and contents of each 
and the lines of discrimination between them as so used, and … the relations between their various 
subjects.”157 This knowledge was now easier to obtain because of “[t]he gradual evolution of a 
uniform classification founded on the principles set forth herein, for the American Digest and 
General Digest systems, and the extensive adoption of that classification.”158 In the final article, 
which described the classification systems of the American Digest and its predecessor the United 
States Digest, Mallory pointed out that “knowledge of the principles applied in such a work is as 
useful to the reader as to the compiler.”159 
                                                 
151 See generally Frederick C. Hicks, The Teaching of Legal Bibliography, 11 Law Libr. J. 2–4 (1918) [hereinafter 
Hicks, Teaching]. 
152 Id. at 2–3.  The Company also sponsored “brief-making” contests.  Id. at 2. 
153 See Brief Making (1906), supra note 29.  The book was regularly reprinted and issued in revised editions into 
the 1930s.  Hicks provides a list of early “books and articles about law books,” but the few titles published before 
Brief Making were bibliographies and did not discuss how to conduct legal research.  See Appendix I: Books and 
Articles about Law Books, in Hicks, Materials and Methods, supra note 11 at 325. 
154 1 Docket (West) 3 (1909). For comments on the content of American Law School Review, see John Henry 
Schlegel, Between the Harvard Founders and the American Legal Realists: The Professionalization of the 
American Law Professor, 35 J. Legal Educ. 311, 318-19 (1985). 
155 On Mallory, see Marvin, supra note 17 at 70–72; 79–80 (calling Mallory “a brilliant legal editor” whose work 
“laid the foundation for what many believe to be the most outstanding achievement in modern legal literature … 
the Key Number plan….” Id. at 79); Daniel Dabney, The Universe of Thinking Thoughts: Literary Warrant and 
West's Key Number System, 99 Law Libr. J. 229, 240 (2007) (“The name John A. Mallory is known to few, but 
his influence is arguably among the greatest of all American lawyers.”).  
156 John A. Mallory, The Use of Law Books, 1 Am. L. Sch. Rev. 113, 118 (1903).   
157 John A. Mallory, Philosophical Classification of Law, 1 Am. L. Sch. Rev. 137, 141 (1904). 
158 Id. at 142. 
159 John A. Mallory, The Theory of the American Digest Classification Scheme, 1 Am. L. Sch. Rev. 184, 186–87 
(1904). 
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Similarly, in 1903, Edward Q. Keasbey, the long-time chair of the ABA Committee on 
Reporting and Digesting, published an American Law School Review article that praised the 
American Digest classification and urged distribution of a West manual explaining the system for 
use in law school instruction.160 In 1906, a tongue-in-cheek article published as “An Interview 
with a Law Student” chastised lawyers who didn’t understand the classification system and law 
schools for not instructing students in its use.161  
In 1907, however, West representative Roger W. Cooley suggested a change in emphasis when 
he described legal research less in terms of finding and applying principles than as a matter of 
reducing the problem being researched to its lowest terms:  
 
A general rule or principle of law ... implies nothing certain ….  So a knowledge of the law 
is to a great degree a knowledge of precedents .... [T]o find cases showing how the principles 
have been applied [the lawyer] must use the facts as a guide, because the application arises 
out of the act, and not vice versa.162 
 
The following year, speaking on a panel with West and Andrews at the third annual meeting 
of the American Association of Law Libraries, Cooley told his audience that, when a lawyer comes 
to the law library, he should already have worked out the principle to be applied to his problem, 
and “what he wants now is cases applying that principle to facts on all fours with, or similar to the 
facts in his case.”163 To find those cases, Cooley suggested that the searcher remember that the 
“cross reference heads and cross references in the digest form an index to the volume. Why not 
use it as such?”164 
In a 1909 article, Cooley again stressed the importance of relying on the facts of the case to 
locate precedents.165  Describing the West’s program of legal research instruction in the law 
schools (without mentioning West or his own affiliation with the company), Cooley noted that “for 
obvious reasons” considerable time in those lectures was devoted to digests and other law-finding 
tools.  Yet: 
Little or no attempt is made to teach the student any theory of classification of the law. … 
In teaching the use of the digest for finding a first case—that is to say, for getting a start in 
the search for authority—use is made of the descriptive word method. The practical 
advantage of this method is that it does not presuppose any particular theory or system of 
classification….166 
With descriptive words from a statement of the facts for the case at issue, the researcher could 
locate the place in the digest “where the law relating to the particular subject-matter, party, ground 
                                                 
160 Edward Q. Keasbey, Instruction in Finding Cases, 1 Am. L. Sch. Rev. 69, 71 (1903) (The manual “should 
give clearly and simply the main headings of the law, and their divisions and subdivisions ..., and should show 
the relations of the various subjects, and where to look in one topic for the limits and modifications of the 
principles of another.”). 
161 General Demurrer, An Interview with a Law Student, 2 Am. L. Sch. Rev. 24 (1906).  
162 Roger W. Cooley, The Purpose of a Digest, 2 Am. L. School Rev. 77, 77 (1907). 
163 Roger W. Cooley, Use of Law Books, 2 Law Libr. J. 1, 2 (1909). 
164 Id. at 3. 
165 Roger W. Cooley, Manual Training for Lawyers, 2 Am. L. Sch. Rev. (West) 261 (1909). 
166 Id. at 262. 
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of action, or remedy is to be found…. [I]f one case is found by use of a descriptive word, that case 
may be used as a key to unlock the whole system of case law on that particular subject.”167 
West’s approach to using the digest seemed to be moving away from Mallory’s emphasis on 
knowledge of the principles of the classification system to use of the facts of the case at hand to 
locate precedents more directly.  Hicks wrote that, in developing their instructional program for 
the law schools, Cooley and other West instructors “applied themselves to devising some easy 
means of finding cases with the result that the ‘descriptive word’ method was formulated.”168 The 
change in approach could be seen in the differences between the 1909 second edition of West’s 
text: Brief Making and the Use of Law Books and the first, published in 1906.  
In the first edition, the single chapter on “How to Find the Law” dealt exclusively with 
classification.  Having carefully developed a statement of facts for his case, lawyers should be able 
to identify a general principle of law either from their own knowledge and experience, or from 
“study of some logical standard of classification,” such as the American Digest system.169 Students 
and lawyers “will find that a study of some standard system of classification, prepared upon logical 
principles and adapted for practical use, will be of inestimable benefit….”170  The bulk of the 
chapter consisted of a description of the American Digest System and definitions of its main heads 
as a means of introducing classification to is intended audience of law students. 
The second edition of Brief Making, edited by Cooley, devoted significantly more attention 
than the first to researching the law.  The chapter on digests noted that, although some lawyers 
begin their research from a principle of law and others from the facts of their case, the searches 
based on principles required conditions that “seldom co-exist: First, that the lawyer knows exactly 
what principle governs his case; and, second, that he has such a thorough knowledge of the theory 
of classification on which his digest is based that he can turn to the particular topic where that 
principle is illustrated.”171  The chapter then described the difficulties of principle-based searching 
compared to the relative ease of the descriptive word method which does not require the lawyer 
“to know the theory or rules of classification” and ignores “all considerations of the science and 
theory of digesting.”172  The chapter finished by outlining research using “the practical method” 
of the descriptive word before turning to sections on the classification system.173  
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168 Hicks, Teaching, supra note  151 at 3. 
169 James E. Wheeler, How to Find the Law, in Brief Making (1906), supra note 37 at 173–74. 
170 Id. at 176. 
171 Roger W. Cooley, How to Find the Law, in Roger W. Cooley, ed., Brief Making and the Use of Law Books 
156, 159 (2d ed. 1909). 
172 Id. 
173 In 1914, however, the third edition of Brief Making announced that “the analysis of the subject [classification] 
in former editions was experimental and the arrangement of the book was governed largely by considerations 
which no longer apply.”  Roger W. Cooley & Charles Lesley Ames, eds., Brief Making and the Use of Law Books 
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predecessor to a chapter on the “mechanical features of digests” which now preceded the chapter on the 
descriptive word method. Id. at 107–35. The chapter closed with a caution to the reader that, although its 
explanation of digest features might have seemed “unnecessarily detailed,… [k]nowledge of these things is 
essential, if one is to get the maximum benefit from the use of these books.” Id. at 135.  Similar language appeared 
in later editions published into the 1930s. 
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In 1912 West introduced its first Descriptive Word Index as “an index or concordance of words 
and terms …, which have been the subject of litigation.”174 The first advertisements for the new 
single volume 2,000 page index noted that it consisted of “words and terms descriptive of the 
persons, places and things, as well as of the crimes, torts, contracts and remedies which have been 
the subject of litigation.”175 Although the classification system was described as “simplicity itself,” 
the Descriptive Word Index would aid researchers “not familiar with its logical and scientific 
arrangement,” who asked “How do I find the Key-Number for the proposition which I am 
investigating.”176  
In a short 1912 American Law School Review article called “The Descriptive Word,” R.A. 
Daly, one of West’s law school instructors, wrote that the aim of legal research in any system “if 
possible, is to find that case, or those cases, where, upon facts similar to the immediate question 
involved, some court has applied the law.” For Daly: “The search for the law has become a search 
for facts to which the legal principles have applied, rather than a search for the abstract principles 
themselves.” 177  
Almost apologetically, Daly ended his article noting that for each digest topic “there will be 
found a long and more or less complicated analysis, requiring close examination to discover just 
where the specific question could be properly placed.”  If the right term were chosen in the index, 
however, “the specific section or sections of the various topics can be found, and the attention at 
once directed thereto, thereby saving much time and anxious thought.”178 In 1914, in a brief article 
touting the need for practical training in legal research, Daly wrote that, in response to the problems 
posed by the multiplicity of books, “law book publishers devised what have seemed to them helpful 
methods of use by means of schemes of classification, mechanical and typographic devices, and 
their combinations….”179  This was hardly a ringing endorsement, particularly in comparison to 
the importance placed on the classification system in John Mallory’s articles only ten years earlier. 
Over the next decade, Daly published several other articles on legal research. These short 
pieces consisted mostly of research problems and answers, but occasionally they discussed the 
context of research for cases. In 1915 Daly argued that the principles of law are “well known to 
the profession” from law school; to apply principles in practice, however, “the court demands 
precedents; that is to say, the court asks for cases decided in the past in which the facts were 
essentially the same.”180  Precedents are found through analysis of the case at hand using the 
descriptive word index.181  In 1920 he wrote that, finding principles was not the point of legal 
research.  Rather, “finding the law in active practice means the locating of that adjudicated case 
                                                 
174 Presentation Letter Sent to Subscribers to Decennial Digest, 1 Docket (West) [773] (1912).  The 2000 page 
first edition of the Index was sent without charge to all purchasers of the Decennial Digest. Id. 
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where some court, somewhere, at some time, applied the principle to facts on all fours with or 
closely paralleling the facts of the case at bar.”182  
The 3,070 page second edition of the Descriptive Word Index, which covered both the first and 
the second decennial digests, was published in 1924.  A single introductory page noted that the 
index included “thousands of catchwords,” as well as the topic titles, Key-Number section lines 
and editorial reference lines in the Decennials.”  As a result, “it can be used as a complete index 
to these books, without any reference whatever to the topical analysis in the various volumes.”183 
It is not clear why West began to place less emphasis on the usefulness of the classification 
system for research in the first decade of the twentieth century, nor why it regained prominence in 
the 1914 and later editions of Brief Making, while articles in West journals continued to emphasize 
the fact-based descriptive word approach.  Yet, the specificity of the bulky descriptive word clearly 
made it easier for lawyers to rely on factual research to find cases on point without seeing more of 
the classification system than the key number for the subject they needed.   
 
VI. Reassessing the Influences of the Digest 
Bob Berring’s arguments about the influences of legal information on lawyers’ thinking are 
compelling and appealing to anyone interested in the history of legal information. In 2003, I 
published an article, “Justice Jackson’s Lament: Historical and Comparative Perspectives on the 
Availability of Legislative History,” with Berring’s ideas in mind.184  That article examined how, 
after late nineteenth century changes in the systems for publishing and distributing federal 
documents, the greater availability of legislative history information might have contributed to 
federal courts’ increased use of legislative history.  For me, it also demonstrated how hard it is to 
show cause and effect relationships, or influences, in historical research. 
From its introduction in 1887, West Publishing Company’s digest and classification system 
clearly made it easier, and perhaps made it possible in light of the many published cases, for 
American lawyers to locate precedents to argue their own cases.  The classification system, 
developed from the work of the Abbott brothers, who were renowned for their digesting skills, and 
by John Mallory and others at West, was comprehensive, sensible, and built with the needs of the 
practicing lawyer in mind.  In the face of the fears of John Dillon and others that the common law 
itself was threatened by the growing numbers of publication, it is also reasonable to think that, by 
providing a superior tool to find cases, West’s digests helped allay those concerns.  
The West digests functioned as what Allan Hanson called a “classified index.” The 
classification system both organized information and provided access to it before there were 
separate fact-specific descriptive word indexes to help lawyers access its contents.  Prior to the 
first Descriptive Word Index in 1912, lawyers presumably entered a West digest at a point 
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determined by their general knowledge of the law, the classification system, or the specific area 
they needed to research.  In the process of seeking precedential cases in the digest, a lawyer had 
the opportunity to learn more about the classification system and how the topic being researched 
related to others.  If so, the digest might have influenced their thinking about American law and 
the common law system itself.  Yet it is hard to know whether lawyers concentrating on locating 
cases on specific points of law would take that opportunity, particularly if they found a “hog case” 
relevant to their problem amidst the masses of cases in the digest. 
After 1912, the specificity of the Descriptive Word Index would encourage the tendency to go 
directly to a relevant key number for precedential cases.  Barbara Bintliff eloquently described 
how the research process might have proceeded, but how can we know how often busy twentieth-
century lawyers used the new more sophisticated indexes to do more than fine tune their searches 
to find the cases they needed?  We know what Peter Schanck thought about this, but we have no 
research to tell us whether Bintliff or Schanck better describes how lawyers used print digests. 
Beyond several early articles by John Mallory stressing the importance of understanding the 
classification system, West’s own instructional publications tended to place greater emphasis on 
searching for cases using the specific fact situations of a problem than on the classification system, 
particularly after West established its law school instruction program and introduced the 
descriptive-word indexes.  Although the 1914 and later editions of Brief Making and the Use of 
Law Books continued to describe the classification system, articles in West’s periodicals 
emphasized fact-based research as the way to find precedential cases. 
We know that at least some late nineteenth century American lawyers saw the benefits of better 
classification as a means to keep the increasingly unwieldy body of the common law from breaking 
down under the multiplicity of published cases.  But those concerns were voiced at meetings of 
the American Bar Association independently from concerns about the poor performance of 
available digests in helping lawyers find the cases they need.  After 1891, by employing separate 
committees to deal with practical digest questions and classification, the ABA formally 
distinguished efforts to improve legal classification from those intended to improve the digests.  
ABA classification committee reports generally failed to mention digest classification systems, 
despite the admiration shown for the Abbott brothers and the recognition provided to West’s digest 
and classification system by other committees concentrating on reporting and digesting.   
In 1902, the Special Committee on Classification’s lengthy report on the importance of legal 
classification failed to note either the virtues or the shortcomings of the schemes devised by the 
Abbotts and Mallory, which at least look like attempts to provide a scientific classification of 
American law.  Digests were not to be judged on the basis of their classification systems.  As 
Benjamin Tradwell told the West Virginia Bar Association, “a Digest which seeks to cultivate the 
appreciation of a higher order of tool must necessarily fail to that extent as a labor-saving 
device….”  Furthermore, “one does not resort to the Digest to learn the general principles of law 
and to observe their relation to each other.”185  If a digest did serve to remind lawyers of the 
principles of law and their relationships, it had apparently failed in its primary task, helping them 
get to the cases. 
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Did the American Digest provide needed structure for the increasingly messy and bulky body 
of published case law spewing forth from federal and state courts in the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth century?  Of course it did.  All one needs to do is look at the books, examine the Century 
Edition and the first Decennial, to see the multiplicity of cases classified and organized under 
West’s topical analysis.  Yet, how the classification systems of the West digests might have 
influenced the thinking of turn-of-the-century American lawyers and their successors about the 
law remains a harder question to answer.  What is clear is that, faced with the increasing bulk of 
published case law, the American bar needed all the help it could get.  
 
